Article

U.S. DOJ releases new uniform corporate enforcement policy

U.S. DOJ releases new uniform corporate enforcement policy
Published Date
Mar 13 2026
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Audrey FeldermanAssociate, New York
Samuel GuggenheimerAssociate, Washington DC
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Evelyn McCorkleAssociate

On March 10, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a new standardized Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (the “Policy”)1 superseding all previously issued policies across divisions and outlining a clear path to leniency for companies who voluntarily disclose misconduct.

The Policy builds upon revisions the Criminal Division made to its corporate enforcement policy (CEP) in May 2025,2 and covers all corporate criminal cases except antitrust matters. The ten-page Policy is intended to provide a uniform set of incentives and processes to encourage self-reporting for companies regardless of the district in which they do so, while still allowing for substantial case-specific prosecutorial discretion.

In addition, the Policy provides more options for leniency in those cases where the presence of aggravating factors may prevent a declination. Overall, while the core elements of the former enforcement policy remain intact, the new Policy adds consistency, speed, and transparency to the process and should result in greater certainty and predictability for companies contemplating whether to self-report.

Key takeaways

  • The Policy supersedes nearly all division-specific or U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement policies previously in effect.
  • The Policy carves out the Antitrust Division’s enforcement policies, including the Leniency Policy.3
  • The Policy sets out a clear pathway to a presumption of declination in cases of voluntary self-disclosure where companies fully cooperate and timely remediate misconduct, while retaining prosecutorial discretion in the presence of specified aggravating circumstances.
  • To receive any of the contemplated incentives under the Policy, companies must self-report directly to the appropriate component of the DOJ; disclosures made to other federal agencies, or state or local governments, generally will not qualify for a declination (but if made in good faith could qualify at the discretion of the DOJ based on the circumstances).
  • A company will still qualify for a declination even if it self-reports after a whistleblower reports to the department, provided it does so promptly and no later than 120 days after receiving the whistleblower’s internal report and otherwise meets the Policy requirements.
  • The Policy establishes a concrete framework for leniency in “near miss” cases, where a company fully cooperates and timely remediates, but the self-reporting does not qualify as voluntary and/or specified aggravating factors warrant a criminal resolution. In such cases, absent particularly egregious aggravating circumstances, the company will still benefit from a non-prosecution agreement with a term of less than three years, no compliance monitor, and a 50–75% penalty reduction.
  • The Policy, which only applies to companies and not individuals, continues to emphasize individual accountability.

Background

On March 10, 2026, the DOJ announced a new Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, which the DOJ described as its “first-ever Department-wide corporate enforcement policy for criminal matters.” Its stated objective is to incentivize early, voluntary self-disclosure, promote timely and effective enforcement of criminal laws, facilitate prompt remedial action, ensure consistency across the DOJ, and transparently describe the DOJ’s policies and decision making.

The new Policy retains the core tenets of the Criminal Division’s previous enforcement policy, last updated in May 2025, but creates additional pathways to leniency for companies that timely self-report misconduct. It supersedes all previous department-specific enforcement policies, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Corporate Enforcement Policy issued in June 2025, and individual policies for the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, such as the Southern District of New York’s CEP issued February 24, 2026. While the substantive shifts in the new Policy are relatively minor, it does allow for greater clarity, transparency, and predictability in the self-reporting process.

Policy overview

The Policy states that the DOJ will decline to prosecute a company for criminal conduct in the following instances:

  • The company voluntarily self-disclosed the misconduct to an appropriate DOJ criminal component.
  • The company fully cooperated with the DOJ’s investigation.
  • The company timely and appropriately remediated the misconduct.
  • There are no aggravating circumstances related to the nature and seriousness of the offense, egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct within the company, severity of harm caused by the misconduct, or corporate recidivism.

The Policy also sets out how the DOJ will handle situations where a company fully cooperated and timely and appropriately remediated but is ineligible for a declination because (a) the company’s self-report did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure (what the Policy terms a “near miss”); and/or (b) aggravating factors nevertheless warrant a criminal resolution. In such cases, the DOJ shall:

  • provide a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) (absent particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances)
  • allow a term length of fewer than three years
  • not require an independent compliance monitor
  • provide a reduction of at least 50% but not more than 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) fine range.

For those cases that neither qualify for a declination nor fall into the “near miss” category, prosecutors maintain the discretion to determine the appropriate resolution, including any compliance obligations and monetary penalty. In such cases, the monetary penalty shall not be reduced by more than 50% of the applicable fine. However, there is a presumption that any reduction will be taken from the low end of the USSG range for companies that fully cooperate and timely and appropriately remediate.

The Policy contains two appendices—one with a flowchart for interpreting the new Policy framework, and the other providing detailed definitions and explanations relating to the concepts of “voluntary self-disclosure,” “full cooperation,” and “timely and appropriate remediation,” as used in the Policy.

While overall the Policy is markedly similar to the Criminal Division’s May 2025 CEP, retaining the Criminal Division’s previous guidance on declinations, “near-miss” voluntary self-disclosures, resolution of other cases, and a self-reporting flow chart of possible outcomes, there are some nuanced differences, which are outlined below.

Criminal Division’s May 2025 enforcement policy Department-wide March 2026 enforcement policy
Scope
Limited to the Criminal Division.
Department-wide. Applies to all corporate criminal matters handled by DOJ, except violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (antitrust).
Approval authority
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division or their designee in coordination with the Deputy Attorney General. 
Assistant Attorney General for the relevant division and/or United States Attorney for the relevant district, in coordination with the Deputy AG and Criminal Division. 
Voluntary self-disclosure 
Must disclose to Criminal Division (though good-faith disclosure to another DOJ component qualifies).
Must disclose to appropriate DOJ criminal component (though good-faith disclosure to another DOJ component qualifies). 
Prosecutorial discretion regarding aggravating circumstances
Introduced provision enabling prosecutors to recommend a declination even with aggravating circumstances after weighing “the severity of those circumstances and the company’s cooperation and remediation.”
Retains prosecutorial discretion to recommend a declination even with specified aggravating circumstances after weighing the “the severity of those circumstances and the company’s voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.”
“Near-miss” voluntary disclosures fine reductions
If ineligible for a declination, but company fully cooperated and appropriately remediated, Criminal Division shall, inter alia, provide a fine reduction of 75% off the low end of the USSG fine range. 
If ineligible for a declination, but company fully cooperated and appropriately remediated, the DOJ shall, inter alia, provide a fine reduction of at least 50% but not more than 75% off the low end of the USSG fine range. 
Compliance monitorships
Introduced provision enabling prosecutors in a “near-miss” disclosure to not require an independent compliance monitor. 
Retained provision directing prosecutors in a “near-miss” disclosure to not require an independent compliance monitor. In other cases, leaves appointment of monitor to discretion of prosecutor, presumably still subject to factors outlined in 2025 Memorandum on Selection of Monitors.
Timely disclosure
No provision addressing disclosures to other agencies. Company must self-report “within 120 days” after receiving a whistleblower’s internal report.
Disclosures made only to federal regulatory agencies, state/local governments, or civil enforcement agencies generally do not qualify, but good-faith disclosures to such entities may qualify “if appropriate under the circumstances.” Company must self-report “as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than 120 days after receiving the whistleblower’s internal report.” 
Transparency
Did not require prosecutors to explain in their corporate resolution agreements why a particular company received a particular amount of cooperation credit.
Requires prosecutors to “include in their corporate resolution agreements information sufficient to outline why a particular company received a particular amount of cooperation credit.” 

Policy goals

In announcing the uniform Policy, the DOJ stated that it is seeking to promote uniformity, predictability, and fairness in its approach to white-collar cases—it did not focus on any particular substantive change. Still, it could prove valuable to companies that rather than facing a patchwork of policies across different DOJ components, they should now be able to rely on the same standards of voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and remediation in their interactions with any DOJ component (and thus more easily point to precedent matters across components when engaging in advocacy).

In addition, the Policy urges prosecutors to endeavor to obtain the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the disclosure in order to make a determination regarding declination or an NPA and inform the company as soon as practicable, so as to minimize uncertainty for companies that self-report.

Looking ahead

As outlined in the DOJ’s announcement, the Policy encourages companies to self-report alleged violations and aims to reward them for doing so. Although some aspects of the Policy provide less guidance than the policies it supersedes, the Policy does provide a uniform framework for companies to voluntarily disclose alleged violations.

While it remains to be seen how the Policy will be enforced in practice, the decision of whether to self-report a potential criminal violation is often one of the most fraught decisions a company can face, and so we view any such simplification of the process as a welcome change. 

Footnotes

1. Department of Justice Releases First-Ever Corporate Enforcement Policy for All Criminal Cases, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs (Mar. 10, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-first-ever-corporate-enforcement-policy-all-criminal-cases.

2. Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Disclosure Policy 9-47.120, U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division (May 12, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400031/dl?inline.

3. Leniency Policy, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (last visited March 11, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-policy. 

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