The French Duty of Vigilance Act: lessons from the past five years and predictions for the next five

For businesses, the core question is not only what the Act requires on a micro level, but also how to embed compliance with the Act as part of an enterprise strategy that manages litigation, reputational, and operational risk. This article distills business-facing lessons from the first five years and flags open issues that should inform board oversight and day-to-day implementation.

Lessons from the past five years

The Act has triggered a broad corporate response. Companies now publish longer vigilance plans, with more detailed risk mapping and clearer remediation measures. These disclosures have had ripple effects across global value chains, including on foreign entities. Some subcontractors and suppliers have been pushed to adopt commitments for their own value chains on environmental harm, human rights, and health and safety.

Civil society has used the Act to press for change. NGOs, and to a lesser extent trade unions, have not hesitated to request meetings with companies, write letters to them alleging deficiencies in their vigilance plans, or even issue formal notices requiring companies to comply with the Duty of Vigilance Act as part of a pre-litigation process. This notice is seen as a core element of stakeholder dialogue: courts have confirmed that a formal notice is a mandatory precondition to proceedings. Alternative dispute resolution has also shown itself to be a viable way of concluding proceedings. For example, a dispute between a French food products company and a coalition of NGOs over the company’s vigilance plan was resolved through mediation.

The adoption of the French Duty of Vigilance Act also had an impact on the judicial system. The Paris Judicial Court created a specialized ESG chamber (the 34th) to hear cases concerning the Act and related issues, mirrored on appeal by the Paris Court of Appeal’s chamber 5–12. These chambers have heard high-profile cases, among them several proceedings against large French multinationals, including an energy company (in respect of alleged human rights and environmental risks linked to overseas projects) and a bank (in respect of climate-related financing). Although these chambers might have been expected to take a bold line as a result of their specialist role, their approach in practice has been one of caution at this stage (bearing in mind some important cases will be judged in 2026). Where they have ruled on substance, such rulings have included confirmation that risk mapping is the backbone of a vigilance plan, with other measures of the plan, including remediation actions, flowing logically from that mapping.

Predictions for the next five

A central question concerns the implications of the European CS3D for the French vigilance regime. To date, French courts have adopted a deferential approach. Even though the CS3D has not yet been transposed the Paris Court of Appeal has held that the French Duty of Vigilance Act should be construed in a way that does not frustrate the objectives of the directive—a ruling informed by the EU principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union.

In addition, over the next five years, courts are expected to clarify how intensely they are to monitor vigilance plans adopted by companies. There are good arguments that review should be on the less intrusive side, confined to verifying completeness and internal coherence. Such arguments include promoting certainty for companies and taking into account the nature of the vigilance plan, which is a self-regulatory document by companies falling within the scope of the Act.

As with the CS3D, an important aspect of the French Duty of Vigilance Act is its extraterritoriality. As a consequence, questions as to its interaction with foreign legal regimes remain open. By potentially requiring companies to surpass host-state standards, the Act risks encroaching on foreign sovereign regulatory choices. Future case Act will therefore need to clarify the role of the French courts.

Another critical issue concerns the status under the Act of suppliers and subcontractors in the value chain. The obligation placed on companies by the Act to identify and prevent environmental and human rights impacts extends to suppliers and subcontractors with which that company has an “established commercial relationship”. If suppliers and subcontractors beyond immediate counterparties are covered, there is force in the view that it would be disproportionate to hold companies liable for harm caused by indirect suppliers and subcontractors, over whom they often have limited leverage.

Conclusion

In the coming years, the contours of the French Duty of Vigilance Act will likely be clarified through case Act. In this regard, courts may consider the CS3D, including any amendments thereto. This evolving legal landscape will shape how companies operationalize due diligence and manage ESG risks across their value chains.