Evidence of this is readily available in the U.S., where Novo Nordisk is currently facing multiple class action lawsuits from investors alleging disclosure failures relating to GLP-1 products and the weight-loss drug CagriSema.1 Meanwhile, changes to the disclosure obligation in the EU took effect on June 5, 2026, raising pressing questions of the future of securities litiga-tion in the secondary market.
This article considers the legal framework for secondary market shareholder claims across three jurisdictions, i.e., in Den-mark, the United States, and the Netherlands. The analysis suggests that while Danish tort law generally permits individual shareholder claims to be brought, the procedural framework, in particular the absence of a binding collective settlement mechanism, fundamentally limits the viability of funded mass shareholder litigation.
By contrast, the United States and the Netherlands provide judicially supervised mechanisms through which comprehensive, class-wide settlements can be achieved. Accordingly, it is suggested that the present Danish legal framework does not sup-port or facilitate the kind of collective resolution that makes third-party funded shareholder litigation commercially viable, compared to similar claims being brought in the United States or the Netherlands.
Introduction
This article examines shareholder claims in the secondary securities market, namely those claims brought by investors who traded shares on a regulated exchange after their issue and allege that the issuer’s failure to meet its continuous disclosure obligations caused them to trade at distorted prices. In EU member states, the disclosure obligation derives from the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), specifically Article 17, which requires issuers to disclose inside information as soon as possible.2 In the United States, the corresponding claims arise under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 adopted thereunder.
The economics of these claims push toward collective proceedings. The pool of affected investors is typically large—often thousands of shareholders who traded shares during the relevant period—but individual losses are frequently too small to justify standalone litigation. Further, insurance companies offering directors and officers' insurance with coverage for securi-ties claims—so-called “side C D&O insurance”—may attract litigation, as the existence of such insurance arguably improves the prospects of pursuing and recovering on larger claims.
As a likely consequence, third-party litigation funders have entered this space, underwriting the plaintiffs’ costs in exchange for a share of any recovery, typically between 20% and 40% of net proceeds. Their business model depends on comprehen-sive resolution, which, in practice, often means a settlement that provides a meaningful return within a commercially realistic time frame. This requirement places a high value on the availability of binding collective settlement mechanisms, and it is precisely here that jurisdictions diverge most sharply.
The legal infrastructure available to investors varies dramatically. In the United States, securities class actions have been a feature of the litigation landscape for decades, supported by the fraud-on-the-market presumption, standardized damages methodologies, and a judicially supervised settlement framework that delivers binding, class-wide resolution. The Nether-lands has developed its own sophisticated mechanisms, i.e., Wet afwikkeling massaschade in collectieve actie (WAMCA) for collective actions and Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade (WCAM) for collective, court-approved settlements, that achieve results comparable with the U.S. within the EU regulatory framework.
In Denmark, shareholder litigation backed by third-party funders is new. This article examines whether Danish law, as cur-rently constituted, can support the kind of comprehensive and binding settlements that make funded shareholder litigation commercially viable. The article suggests that, because of the multiple procedural obstacles to comprehensive and binding settlements for securities class actions in Denmark, such funded shareholder litigation is not currently commercially viable in a Danish procedural context.
Securities litigation in Denmark
The Danish law that governs shareholder claims in the secondary securities market can be examined along three axes: the legal standard of liability for breach of Article 17 MAR (Section 2.1); the homogeneity requirement governing collective pro-ceedings (Section 2.2); and the constraints on settlement (Section 2.3). Each presents distinct obstacles to the resolution of mass shareholder claims through comprehensive and binding settlements.
Danish legal standard of civil liability in the secondary securities market
No specific statutory provision governs civil liability for breach of market disclosure obligations in Denmark. Analysis must therefore proceed by applying general tort law principles within the regulatory framework established by MAR.
Article 17 MAR requires an issuer to “inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns that issuer.” Under Article 7 MAR, “inside information” means precise, nonpublic information that, if made public, would likely have a significant effect on the price of the relevant financial instruments, i.e., the shares of the company.
The purpose of the disclosure obligation is to ensure that market participants have access to the information necessary for a complete, correct and timely assessment of the issuer’s situation, thereby ensuring a level playing field for investing in pub-licly traded companies.
In its current form, the disclosure duty in Article 17 MAR is ad hoc, meaning that the obligation to disclose inside information is triggered as soon as possible after the inside information comes into existence, or for inside information in protracted processes, e.g., an M&A transaction or contract negotiations, once the intermediate step meets the threshold of “inside in-formation.” This threshold is met when there is a realistic prospect, based on an overall assessment of the factors existing at the time, that the process will be completed. As of June 5, 2026, changes to Article 17 MAR provide for a simplified disclo-sure obligation in case of protracted processes, requiring disclosure only after the final event or circumstance has occurred.3
The clear starting point is that the inside information must be disclosed to the market as soon as possible, unless the public disclosure is delayed. Delayed disclosure is permitted under Article 17(4) MAR, provided certain conditions are met. Such conditions include that immediate publication would prejudice the issuer’s legitimate interests, that the issuer is able to en-sure the confidentiality of the inside information and that delaying the publication is not misleading.
In the absence of a specific statutory basis, civil liability for breach of Article 17 MAR must be assessed overall under the four general conditions of Danish tort law: (i) negligence; (ii) loss; (iii) causation; and (iv) foreseeability. Each element must be established for each individual claim. As will be seen in the discussion of the four conditions below, there is no certainty as to how the Danish courts would approach a claim under Article 17 MAR.
In the context of secondary market securities litigation, the assessment provides for two cumulative requirements; an objec-tive test concerning whether the issuer breached the disclosure obligation, and a subjective test concerning whether the issuer knew or should have known that its disclosures were deficient. This assessment is inherently difficult. For instance, as regards the objective element, Article 17 MAR requires a continuous evaluation of when emerging facts have become suffi-ciently precise and price-sensitive to trigger disclosure, and courts must make that evaluation retrospectively while account-ing for the issuer’s right to delay disclosure under Article 17(4).4
The court's evaluation of the objective element is made retrospectively, but the decision on this point cannot take into ac-count later developments that the issuer did not or could not reasonably know at the time of the alleged breach and should therefore be assessed on ex ante available information.5
Furthermore, with respect to the subjective element, it remains uncertain whether plain negligence suffices or whether a higher threshold of qualified negligence must be met to establish civil liability for breach. While current case law suggests that plain negligence is sufficient, this jurisprudence has developed in the context of primary market regulation, which pre-sents distinct characteristics relevant to the assessment of liability—notably, the direct contractual relationship between the issuing company and the shareholder arising by virtue of the prospectus.
The question of director liability for breach of, inter alia, the disclosure obligation now regulated in Article 17 MAR was exam-ined in the Danske Bank litigation, where investors alleged that the bank's former CEO was personally liable for failing to ensure timely disclosure of the bank’s exposure to money laundering in its Estonian branch. The City Court in Lyngby found that the CEO had not been shown to have had, or to have been under a duty to obtain, information indicating that the money laundering was of such magnitude as to be materially price-sensitive.6
The court accepted that it was not negligent for the CEO to rely on information received from the responsible operations within the organization. The judgment was delivered by a three-judge panel at first instance and has been appealed to the Eastern High Court.
Whether a claim can be directed against the issuing company itself, as distinct from individual directors, remains uncertain. As such, it is not entirely settled if general principles of corporate law concerned with capital maintenance and equal treat-ment of shareholders prevent claims by shareholders against the company for breach of the disclosure obligations under Article 17 MAR.
A 2021 Danish Supreme Court decision suggests that such company-directed claims may not be available. The case con-cerned prospectus liability, and the court stated in an obiter dictum that “shareholders' claims arising from culpable man-agement decisions taken as part of the company's ordinary operations cannot be directed against the company.”7
Although the finding was delivered in the context of primary market prospectus liability, its reasoning—anchored in principles of capital maintenance, equal treatment, and insolvency law—is not confined to that context. In the legal literature, commen-tators have relied on the decision to argue that, because shareholders trading in the secondary market lack a contractual relationship with the issuer, claims against the company itself are unavailable in that context.
However, absent a direct ruling from the Danish courts in the context of secondary market litigation, it remains uncertain whether the issuing company can itself be held liable for breach of the disclosure duty under Article 17 MAR towards share-holders who traded on the secondary market.
The second element is loss. Two categories of loss are generally available. The first is the total investment loss claim, under which the investor asserts that the investment would not have been made at all had the issuer complied with its disclosure obligations, thus quantified as the entire investment. The second is the overprice claim, under which the investor asserts that it paid more for the shares than they were actually worth, quantified as the difference between the price paid and the price that would have prevailed had the market been properly informed.
Establishing loss under either category is a complex, fact-sensitive exercise. In a city court judgment from 2020, the City Court applied an expert-assisted comparison of the share price against the “KAX index” at the time of purchase to isolate the price effect of the manipulation, acknowledging considerable uncertainty. A principal claim of DKK83million thus produced a court-assessed loss of DKK3.75m.
In its reasoning, the court rejected the total investment loss claim, finding, inter alia, that the investor had never formally terminated the agreement for the purchase of the shares and that the loss stemming from the investment predominantly was due to the fact that the investor had sold its shares at specific points in time for liquidity reasons, rather than in response to disclosure of the manipulation.
Further to the above, the loss claimed engages the third element of causation. Different loss categories give rise to different causation requirements that in turn produce different damage assessments.
For total investment loss claims, the investor must prove that the transaction would not have occurred had the market re-ceived timely and accurate disclosures. For overprice claims, causation has two requirements: first to show that the investor traded in reliance on the completeness of the issuer's disclosures (whether previous disclosures or, in the plaintiff's view, inadequate disclosures); and second to show that the corrective disclosure actually caused the price to decline, isolated from general market movements and other factors.
The causation requirement raises the question whether a presumption of reliance is available. In prospectus liability on the primary market, the Danish Supreme Court8 has established such a presumption—where a subscription occurred on the basis of a materially deficient prospectus, it is presumed that the subscription would not have occurred had the prospectus been correct.
Whether an analogous presumption applies in the secondary market, where the investor trades on a continuous stream of disclosures rather than a single document, remains undecided. Indirect support can be drawn from the City Court judgment from 2020 referred to above, which anchored the presumption in the integrity of the market price rather than in the prospec-tus relationship. That judgment was delivered at first instance, albeit with a panel of three judges, but has not been tested on appeal.
Even where causation can be established, the fourth element of foreseeability operates as an additional filter. As such, re-covery may be limited to the loss that the issuer could reasonably have foreseen as a consequence of the nondisclosure. This requirement may have particular effect where the investor seeks to be restored to the position of never having acquired the shares—a claim that, depending on the facts, may extend well beyond the price impact of the undisclosed information.
The homogeneity requirement
Denmark introduced a class action regime in 2008 through Sections 254a–254k of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.9 Section 254b(1) sets out cumulative conditions for admissibility of class action lawsuits, including that the claims must be homogeneous, i.e., that the claims must be based on the same factual and legal grounds, that a class action must be the optimal procedural vehicle, and that a suitable group representative must be available. Where the claim seeks a declaration that the defendant is liable in damages, the homogeneity assessment extends to all four tort elements: negligence, loss, causation, and foreseeability.
In secondary market litigation, this homogeneity hurdle is particularly difficult to clear because investors are very likely to have acquired and disposed of shares at different times, at different prices, under varying investment strategies, and with varying degrees of information, all of which affect individual causation and loss.10
Established Danish case law confirms this difficulty. In the Danske Bank case, the Eastern High Court upheld the dismissal of a class action brought by Foreningen Aktionær i Danske Bank, finding that the claims were insufficiently homogeneous because civil liability assessments regarding causation and foreseeability required individual assessment for each share-holder’s purchase date and individual circumstances.11
Class actions have been admitted in primary market claims anchored to a single prospectus, such as in the OW Bunker case, but even in this case, the Eastern High Court required that the class be defined tightly, that the shares be purchased by a specific date and that the shares remained held at the time of bankruptcy.12
Settlement constraints and the equal treatment paradox
The limitations described above converge on the question of settlement.
The class action framework distinguishes between opt-in and opt-out proceedings. The default is opt-in, following which members must actively register to join the class. Opt-out class actions—where all members of a defined group are included unless they withdraw—are available only in narrow circumstances and are not generally available against private defend-ants. In shareholder litigation against listed companies in Denmark, the class is therefore limited to investors who affirmative-ly opt in and so any settlement only binds those who opted in. There is no mechanism for achieving a settlement that binds all of the affected shareholders, unlike in the Netherlands or the United States, see below.
Moreover, the requirement of individual causation in Denmark effectively precludes the use of class actions in most second-ary market cases. This means that most securities claims must therefore be brought individually in Denmark, although the Danish Administration of Justice Act permits consolidation if certain requirements are met. Consolidation allows multiple plaintiffs to sue in the same proceedings, yet each claim is treated as its own and the consolidation of the claims carries no comprehensive settlement-binding effect; each party must individually agree to any settlement. Such settlement reached with one plaintiff in a consolidated claims case has no effect whatsoever on the claims of other plaintiffs in the same pro-ceedings, let alone on the claims of investors who are not party to those proceedings.
Even if a settlement is reached, section 45 of the Danish Companies Act prohibits unjustified differential treatment of share-holders in comparable circumstances.13 The provision prohibits the company from conferring an advantage on one share-holder or group of shareholders at the expense of others, unless all shareholders in equivalent positions are offered equiva-lent treatment.
This constraint is considered to apply to payments made by the company to its shareholders in accordance with voluntary settlements. In the context of secondary market shareholder claims, section 45 thus creates a distinctive constraint. It means that any settlement payment to one group of shareholders in respect of alleged disclosure failures triggers an obligation to make equivalent compensation available to all shareholders who suffered equivalent harm (and concerning the same al-leged breach of the disclosure duty of Article 17 MAR).
However, Danish law provides no mechanism through which a settlement can be made universally binding on all affected shareholders. The result is then that the company cannot pay an investor by way of execution of a settlement to end an ongoing lawsuit without the risk of incurring obligations to all others, and no procedural vehicle exists through which it can discharge those obligations comprehensively.
Thereby, the equal treatment principle, which is designed to protect shareholders, operates in practice as a barrier to settle-ments that would otherwise compensate them.
These constraints have already shaped outcomes. In the known funded shareholder cases in Denmark—brought as individ-ual consolidated cases—proceedings have been resolved on a walk-away basis with the listed company effectively paying nothing in settlement and admitting no wrongdoing:
- In the Vestas case, investors brought claims before the City Court of Aarhus against the former CEO and chair of the board, seeking damages of DKK72.3m. The case was settled with the defendants’ litigation costs being paid in lieu of any damages award.14 Parallel class action proceedings in the United States against Vestas Wind Systems A/S and certain board members were resolved by a settlement of USD5m in 2014.15
- In the Novo Nordisk case, shareholders including pension funds and asset managers brought claims of DKK11.8bn alleging that Novo Nordisk had misled the market by maintaining inflated long-term sales expectations for its U.S. insulin business.16 The case was settled in January 2022 without payment or admission of liability.17 A parallel U.S. class action produced a settlement of approximately USD100m.18
The pattern above consistently underscores that Danish proceedings produce no monetary settlement. Where claims frag-ment across multiple parallel case complexes, a settlement with one case complex has no effect on any other. For a litiga-tion funder, whose return depends on comprehensive resolution within a defined time frame, this fragmentation is uninviting.
Conclusion on funded shareholder litigation in the secondary securities market in Denmark
The class action framework in Denmark is, as such, not shaped to secondary market claims. The homogeneity requirement rarely accommodates the heterogeneity inherent in shareholder trading histories, and where class actions have been admit-ted, the class definitions were tightly drawn around a single prospectus. The limited availability of collective proceedings and above all the absence of a universally binding settlement mechanism most acutely affects the practical dynamics. Even if a settlement were to be reached, the equal treatment obligation blocks selective compensation.
Consequently, for litigation funders, Danish secondary market claims are materially less attractive propositions than equiva-lent claims in jurisdictions offering binding collective settlement. Further, whilst Danish liability standards in the context of secondary securities litigation do allow shareholders to bring damages claims for breach of the disclosure duty in Article 17 MAR, the applicable legal standards for loss quantification, as well as the requirements of causation and foreseeability, pro-vide ample grounds for concern as to the remedies theoretically available to the shareholders.
The U.S. position
The United States has the most developed framework for secondary market shareholder litigation. The primary vehicle is the implied private right of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, which prohibit fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
One of the key doctrinal foundations for these claims is the fraud-on-the-market presumption, established by the U.S. Su-preme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). It asserts that in an efficient market, the price of a publicly trad-ed security reflects all publicly available information, and an investor who purchases at an artificially inflated price is pre-sumed to have relied on the misstatement by virtue of having traded at the market price. When a plaintiff meets its burden to prove the securities at issue traded in an efficient market and the defendant does not then rebut the presumption of reliance, the reliance requirement will generally be satisfied for all investors. Without this presumption, each investor suing the com-pany would need to prove individual reliance.
The main objective of the plaintiff is thus to survive a motion to dismiss. Under the specific and heightened pleading re-quirements applicable to complaints brought pursuant to Section 10(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act, the complaint must specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, and the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.19
If the plaintiff defeats a motion to dismiss, the case goes into the discovery phase, thereby putting pressure on the issuing company and thus increasing the plaintiff's chances of obtaining a settlement on favorable terms. This practical implication is evident in practice as the vast majority of U.S. securities class actions that survive a motion to dismiss settle before trial.20 Such procedural clearing mechanisms that may trigger settlement dynamics are not available under the Danish legal frame-work.
Equally important is the event study methodology. In connection with their request for the court to certify a class, shareholder plaintiffs attempt to establish that a statistical analysis of abnormal share price movements at the time of corrective disclo-sures isolates the portion of the price decline attributable to the alleged misstatements or omissions. If a class is certified, aggregate potential damages become a mathematical exercise as a per-share damage figure multiplied by total affected shares.
This standardization makes class-wide settlements negotiable as both sides can calculate exposure with reasonable preci-sion. By contrast, in Denmark, no equivalent methodology carries similar recognized evidentiary weight as loss is determined through individualized judicial assessment.
Any settlement must be approved by the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which requires a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. An approved settlement binds all class members, including nonparticipants, subject only to opt-out. A single settlement therefore delivers “global peace.” The American system for settling securities claims on a class-wide basis also usually involves plaintiffs’ lawyers who have worked on a contingent fee and receive attor-neys’ fees as a percentage of the amount of the class-wide settlement, subject to court approval. In Denmark, the loser-pays rule adds a further layer of risk for the shareholder plaintiffs.
The Dutch position
The Netherlands has become Europe’s leading jurisdiction for collective shareholder litigation. As in Denmark, Article 17 MAR provides the regulatory basis for secondary market claims. However, the procedural framework is fundamentally differ-ent in two decisive respects. One, the WAMCA which enables collective damages actions, and two, the WCAM, which ena-bles collective settlement outside of litigation.
The WAMCA in force since January 1, 2020, introduced collective monetary damages claims. Only a legal entity such as a foundation or association deemed representative of the class of injured parties may act as plaintiff. Where multiple organiza-tions file, the court appoints a single exclusive representative. The WAMCA operates on an opt-out basis, following which class members are bound by the outcome unless they affirmatively withdraw. This is in stark contrast to the Danish class action framework under which class actions operate on an opt-in basis, the class is limited to those who registered, and there is no comparable mechanism for achieving a binding outcome extending to the full spectrum of affected investors.
More important still is the WCAM in force since 2005. The WCAM enables parties to negotiate out-of-court settlement and jointly petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to declare it binding on all persons in a defined class, without prior litigation. The court scrutinizes the settlement for fairness and adequacy. Class members who do not opt out are bound, even if they were not party to the negotiation. The WCAM has been used to resolve some of the largest securities disputes in European history, including the Fortis/Ageas settlement (approximately EUR1.3bn), the Royal Dutch Shell reserves restatement case, and the Converium case.
The WCAM resolves the equal treatment tension that impedes monetary settlement under Danish law. As the court-approved settlement is binding on all class members; a company that settles under the WCAM simultaneously discharges its obligations to all affected shareholders. The equal treatment principle under Article 2:92 of the Dutch Civil Code is satisfied because the settlement applies uniformly.
In both WAMCA and the WCAM cases, Dutch courts have been critical of how the litigation funder or claim vehicle are com-pensated out of the proceeds of a collective action or settlement.
Both the U.S. and Dutch frameworks thus offer companies a mechanism to pay once and achieve finality (except for those that opt-out), the litigation funder thereby receives a return, the class is compensated, and the litigation is concluded. In Denmark, that sequence is not available.
Reflection and perspectives
The comparison across the three jurisdictions proceeds along three dimensions. The first concerns settlement architecture. Rule 23(e) in the United States and the WCAM in the Netherlands both provide judicially supervised mechanisms through which a single, comprehensive settlement extinguishes the rights of an entire class. Denmark has no equivalent mechanism.
As noted above, mass shareholder claims are notoriously difficult to bring before the courts due to the requirement of homo-geneity among the claims of individual group members. Moreover, an opt-in class action binds only those members who have registered and opt-out class actions against private defendants are not available. The practical consequence is not that claims cannot be brought, but that they cannot be resolved collectively and with finality, whether through a judicial decision or a settlement.
The second dimension is burden of proof. The U.S. fraud-on-the-market presumption and event study methodology convert individual proof questions into class-wide statistical ones, making aggregate damages calculable. In the Netherlands, indi-vidual proof is more demanding, but the WAMCA and WCAM frameworks may absorb that complexity through collective resolution mechanisms. In Denmark, the individual burden of proof remains intact, and its interplay with the loss and causa-tion assessment reinforces the bar to class action.
The third dimension is the equal treatment paradox. Although the content of the doctrines varies, all three jurisdictions im-pose equal treatment obligations on listed companies. In the United States and the Netherlands, collective settlement mech-anisms discharge that obligation by making the same terms available to the entire class. In Denmark, the obligation pre-cludes selective payment while the absence of any universal settlement mechanism makes comprehensive payment equally unavailable. The equal treatment principle in Denmark thus operates as a de facto constraint on settlement.
The Danish cases examined in this article, namely those involving Vestas and Novo Nordisk, illustrate how these procedural limitations shape litigation outcomes. Regardless of the substantive merits of the underlying claims,21 the procedural frame-work's inability to deliver the comprehensive, binding resolution that both plaintiffs and defendants require for settlement to be realistic may have materially influenced the result. The walk-away outcomes may best be understood, at least in part, as rational responses to these procedural constraints.
In summary, individual shareholder claims in the secondary market for breach of disclosure obligations are substantively admissible in Denmark and can be pursued through established tort law principles. However, the absence of effective collec-tive settlement mechanisms—in particular a binding settlement vehicle comparable to Rule 23(e) or the WCAM—deprives both investors and companies of the tools needed for efficient resolution. This procedural gap reduces the expected return on funded litigation, increases the cost and complexity of coordinating claims, and denies the companies the ability to achieve finality.
The current framework in Denmark, while open to individual claims, does not, as such, seem to offer the procedural architec-ture needed to make third-party funders consider that mass shareholder litigation in Denmark is commercially viable.
Footnotes
1 Securities class action Barta v. Novo Nordisk A/S, et al (Link: Novo Nordisk A/S (NVO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit Update); Securities class action Moon v. Novo Nordisk A/S (Link: Novo Nordisk (NVO) Hit with Investor Lawsuit Over CagriSema Obesity Drug - Hagens Berman)
2 EU Regulation 596/2014 to be amended by EU Regulation 2024/2809
3 Following the entry into effect of the EU Regulation 2024/2809 (the “Listing Act”), Article 17 MAR provides that “[a]n issuer shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside infor-mation which directly concerns that issuer. That requirement shall not apply to inside information related to intermediate steps in a protracted process as referred to in Article 7(2) and (3) where those steps are connected with bringing about or resulting in particular circumstances or a particular event. In a protracted process, only the final circumstances or final event shall be required to be disclosed, as soon as possible after they have occurred.”
4 Importantly, Article 17 MAR does not provide for any free-standing duty to investigate.
5 The complexity of the ex post assessment of the alleged breach of the disclosure duty will likely not change following the entry into force of the Listing Act; even in protracted process-es, the courts will still have to determine when the “final circumstances or the final event” has occurred.
6 Case no. BS-8257/2020
7 Authors' translation.
8 Case published as “U.2013.1107 H”.
9 For consumers, a Danish law has made it significantly easier, including across EU borders, to bring collective claims since June 2023 against businesses for breaches of EU consum-er protection rules.
10 For institutional investors specifically, the chosen investment strategy may greatly affect the outcome of the homogeneity assessment. Thus, institutional investors generally operate under various investment strategies, some of which do not consider the information available on the market but rather follow an index, a short selling strategy or similar.
11 Case published as “U.2022.2335 Ø”
12 Case published as “U.2019.962 Ø”
13 Albeit an independent Danish corporate law principle, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders applies by virtue of Article 85 of EU 2017/1132 (June 14, 2017) relating to certain aspects of company law.
14 News regarding the conclusion of the case published on September 18, 2020: Investorer opgiver erstatningssag mod tidligere Vestas-profiler
15 Company announcement by Vestas on December 9, 2014: Vestas - Forlig af amerikansk søgsmål godkendt af domstolen
16 News regarding the initiation of the case published on August 16, 2019: Sure investorer sagsøger Novo Nordisk for kursmanipulation – kræver 11,8 mia. kr. i erstatning
17 News regarding the settlement of the case published on January 14, 2022: Novo Nordisk indgår forlig i sag om vildledende information
18 News regarding the settlement of the case published on September 24, 2021: Novo Nordisk indgår forlig for trecifret millionbeløb i speget sag mod Rebien og andre topfolk - Finans
19 See the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)
20 Economic consulting firm Cornerstone reports that in recent years, approximately 40–60% of Rule 10b-5 securities class actions were dismissed. See https://www.cornerstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2025-Year-in-Review.pdf at 16. When a securities class action is not dismissed on the pleadings, it will then typically eventually settle. See id. Cornerstone reports that only 0.4% of these cases reach trial. See id.
21 In the Danish case against the former CEO and chairman of the board of Vestas, the insufficiency of evidence adduced by the plaintiffs—both in terms of documentary materials and witness testimony during the trial proceedings before the City Court in Aarhus—was alleged to have had a decisive and material impact on the outcome of the case.
