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ECJ clarifying the interpretation of payment services under Payment Services Directive 2?

ECJ clarifying the interpretation of payment services under Payment Services Directive 2?

On July 16, 2026, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its judgment in the case C-51/25. The judgment broadly follows the opinion of Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona, advocate general of the ECJ, discussed in the previous version of this briefing below, and applies, rather surprisingly, a narrower interpretation of payment services under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (Payment Services Directive 2—PSD2) than is currently employed in many member states, including Germany.

The court’s ruling relatively clearly states that providers of security deposit services who forward funds as an ancillary activity should not be covered by PSD2.

However, the ruling is in different respects ambiguous. Hence, it is unclear how far-reaching the practical consequences of the ruling will be in scenarios where potential payment services are provided in an ancillary manner and without an account. It will therefore remain highly interesting to see how national competent authorities (NCAs) will implement the ruling and whether it will have any impact on the upcoming Payments Package. 

Factual background

The case was brought before the ECJ in the form of a preliminary ruling within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU. 

The court was faced with the question of whether the business activities of the plaintiff, Betaal Garant Nederland CV (Betaal), which offers, among other services, security deposits for construction contracts, fall under the definition of payment services. For the security deposit, Betaal enters into an agreement with the client and the building contractor. 

On this basis, Betaal receives a part of the first instalment due from the client and retains it in a payment account in its own name until the construction is completed. Only when the client and contractor notify Betaal that the construction has been duly completed does Betaal forward the retained amount to the contractor.

The Dutch supervisory authority, De Nederlandsche Bank NV (DNB), considered this service to be a payment service in the form of the execution of payment transactions, more specifically the execution of a credit transfer under Article 4 point (3) in conjunction with point (3)(c) of Annex I to the PSD2, for which Betaal did not have the necessary licence. 

Subsequently, DNB prohibited the further provision of this service and imposed a penalty payment on Betaal. After the Dutch court of first instance agreed with the DNB’s opinion, the court of appeal referred the case to the ECJ.

Participation of other member states and the commission

In the proceedings, the advocate general and a number of parties have submitted their opinions to the ECJ. These were quite diverse: the Dutch government followed the opinion of its supervisory authority and argued that the services should be regarded as a payment service. The Italian government and the European Commission disagreed, arguing Betaal’s business model did not constitute a payment service. The Czech government considered it a payment service only under certain conditions, and the Norwegian government considered it instead to be money remittance.

The ECJ's reasoning

The ECJ concludes that PSD2 “excludes from its scope providers of security deposit services which use, in an ancillary manner, payment services offered by other providers of such services as a primary service in the exercise of their regular occupation or business activity.”

The arguments leading to this conclusion shall be examined in the following.

Literal interpretation of PSD2 definitions

The ECJ begins with the literal interpretation of defined terms in PSD2. It holds that, for the “execution of credit transfers”, PSD2 requires the payment service provider to hold a payer’s payment account, as follows from Article 4(8) read in conjunction with Article 4(24) PSD2. Since, in the case at hand, Betaal does not itself hold an account for the payer, it does not fulfil the requirements of a credit transfer under PSD2.

The court generally states that in the context of the two sub-transactions (from the payer to Betaal and from Betaal to the payee), the execution of payment transactions falls under the responsibility of the respective payment service providers of the client and Betaal. In the court’s view, the contractual relationship between the client, the contractor, and Betaal is not relevant to the actual provision of the payment service (which is instead governed by the payment service contract each party has with its respective payment service provider).

Instead, the court holds that the actual service which Betaal offers, and which is the purpose for the payments, is a personal guarantee. The provision of such guarantee is neither defined nor governed by PSD2 and therefore falls outside its scope.

Systematic interpretation of PSD2 provisions

The ECJ goes on to note that, under Article 4(24) and point 3 of Annex I to the PSD2, the Directive is intended to apply only to payment services provided by entities falling within one of the categories listed in Article 1(1) PSD2. These include, inter alia, credit institutions, electronic money institutions, payment institutions and post office giro institutions.

The court’s argument in this regard seems to be that a company whose main business model does not fall into one of these categories should not be regulated under PSD2. The ECJ sees this line of argumentation supported by Recital 24 of PSD2, which limits the application of the PSD2 framework to payment service providers that provide payment services as a regular occupation or business activity.

More importantly, the court addresses proportionality concerns with regard to the strict regulatory regime that applies to payment service providers under PSD2. Since the classification as a payment service has significant legal consequences for any person offering such a service on a professional and regular basis, such classification is “not justified if transfers of funds are made only in order to carry out another service offered as the primary service […] which, in itself, does not fall under the provisions of that directive.” This argumentation seems to support the concept of a general ancillary activity privilege under PSD2, as was already expressed in the advocate general’s opinion.

Turning to the case at hand, the ECJ finds that Betaal does not fall under the categories of payment service providers listed in Article 1(1) PSD2, nor does it itself transfer funds in order to provide its security deposit service (but instead relies on other payment service providers to do so). Consequently, Betaal falls outside the scope of PSD2.

Teleological interpretation of PSD2

Finally, the ECJ rejects the argument that the goal of ensuring a high level of consumer protection requires a broad interpretation of payment services under PSD2. 

This objective, according to the ECJ, “cannot, in itself, alter the scope of the provisions of PSD2 beyond their literal meaning.” Moreover, such an extensive interpretation would run counter to the objective of ensuring legal clarity in the area of payment services.

The court surprisingly also turns to national legislation and notes that, under Article 767 of Book 7 of the Netherlands Civil Code, the security deposit services offered by Betaal constitute an alternative to the security deposit with a notary. PSD2, however, is not intended to cover such services performed by notaries.

While the ruling does not provide for an explicit conclusion to this comparison, the court’s argument seems to be that two comparable services, i.e., the security deposit services performed by a notary and the same services offered by a private company, should not be treated differently, and both should not be regulated by PSD2.

Further aspects of the ECJ’s ruling

The ECJ did not uphold all the advocate general’s arguments—in particular, it did not assess the services from a money remittance perspective, did not rely on the Rasool case (C-568/16), and did not uphold the argument that a payment order must be irrevocable.

However, the court did follow his main line of argument regarding the disproportionality of applying PSD2 to persons who carry out payment services only in order to provide other services outside the scope of PSD2, and also regarding the fact that using an account with another payment service provider could bring an activity outside the scope of PSD2. 

Interestingly, the ECJ also picked up the argument that a comparable activity performed by a notary would not fall within the scope of PSD2, which is consistent with many member states’ competent authorities’ (including the German regulator Bafin) approaches.

Practical impact on the payments sector

While court rulings normally are only binding between the relevant parties, there are particularities regarding preliminary rulings of the ECJ: member states, including their regulatory authorities and courts, are, in general, required to observe the judgment as part of their obligation of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU.

Therefore, NCAs will now have to assess the entirety of the arguments deployed by the ECJ and potentially amend their administrative practice. In particular, this applies to NCAs that have interpreted the PSD2 licensing requirement more widely. We assume that this assessment is likely to take months rather than weeks.

In terms of substance, first feedback from national regulators implies that affected parties should reevaluate whether they would still fall within the PSD2 licensing requirement after the ECJ’s decision and discuss their assessment with their NCA. The practical consequences of such assessment will depend on each entitiy’s current position. Entities licensed as payment institutions might consider returning their licence (and, hence, falling outside the scope of ongoing PSD2 requirements such as reporting, monitoring, own funds, and business requirements).

Meanwhile, entities currently applying for a PSD2 licence might consider whether to proceed with their application, weighing the reputational benefits of being licensed against the costs this will incur (on an ongoing basis). Finally, for those entities who have decided not to apply for a license so far, the legal assessment supporting this decision might become more robust. 
Deciding on the next steps raises practical challenges, as the judgment still leaves questions open.

First, there is the question of how payment services other than credit transfers are affected by the judgment. In Germany, Bafin has traditionally interpreted payment services, in particular money remittance, quite broadly. Although the ECJ’s judgment did not specifically cover money remittance services, it argues that the bespoke activities do not fall within the remit of payment services under PSD2 in general, albeit without going further into detail. 

Second, and potentially even more consequential, is the ECJ’s argument that the provision of a payment service does not fall within the scope of PSD2 if it serves to carry out another main activity not covered by PSD2. Many member states have, so far, not granted an “ancillary activity privilege”, which would remove ancillary activities from the scope of application of the authorisation requirement. Should the ruling in fact have to be interpreted as meaning that PSD2 provides for such a general ancillary activity privilege, this would have far-reaching consequences.

Entire market segments might consequently fall outside the scope of the authorisation requirement under PSD2, e.g., facility, escrow, and paying agents, which have incurred extensive costs in obtaining authorisations and in setting up and maintaining the organisational structures required for their businesses. Also, other business lines providing payments services as an ancillary activity, such as e-commerce, could potentially benefit from an ancillary activity privilege.

Against this backdrop, it also remains unclear how national and European legislators will respond to such a paradigm shift, particularly in light of the soon-to-be-published European Payments Package.

The impact of the ECJ’s ruling will to some extent depend on the jurisdiction where a service provider is located, as the NCAs’ previous approach was not uniform. The largest impact will be on jurisdictions where, like in Germany, a position similar to the DNB’s has been applied so far.

Persons who (potentially) carry out payment services in order to provide other services that fall outside the scope of PSD2 should now proactively engage with their NCA to discuss the implications of this judgment for their specific circumstances.

Updated content

The below content was originally published on March 30, 2026 and has since been updated with the above text.

A case currently before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has the potential to significantly influence the interpretation of payment services regulation in the EU. Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona, advocate general of the ECJ, has published an opinion in which he advocates a narrower interpretation of payment services under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (Payment Services Directive 2—PSD2) than is currently employed in many member states, including Germany. Should the ECJ endorse this view, it would have important consequences for the scope of PSD2.

Background

The case was brought before the ECJ in the form of a preliminary ruling. The court was faced with the question of whether the business activities of the plaintiff, Betaal Garant Nederland CV (Betaal), which offers, among other services, security deposits for construction contracts, fall under the definition of payment services. For the security deposit, Betaal enters into an agreement with the client and the building contractor. 

On this basis, Betaal receives the first of the instalments due from the client and retains it in a payment account in its own name until the construction is completed. Only when the client and contractor notify Betaal that the construction has been duly completed does the contractor receive the final instalment.

The Dutch supervisory authority, De Nederlandsche Bank NV (DNB), considered this service to be a payment service in the form of the execution of payment transactions, more specifically the execution of a credit transfer under Art. 4 point (3) in conjunction with Annex I, point (3)(c) PSD2, for which Betaal did not have the necessary license. 

Subsequently, DNB prohibited the further provision of this service and imposed a penalty payment on Betaal. After the court of first instance agreed with the DNB’s opinion, the court of appeal referred the case to the ECJ.

Participation of other member states

The importance of the question is demonstrated not least by the fact that a number of parties have submitted their opinions to the ECJ. These were quite diverse: the Dutch government followed the opinion of its supervisory authority and argued that the services should be regarded as a payment service. The Italian government and the European Commission disagreed, arguing Betaal’s business model did not constitute a payment service. The Czech government considered it a payment service only under certain conditions, and the Norwegian government considered it instead to be money remittance.

The advocate general’s view

The advocate general has taken a clear position and does not consider the forwarding of a security deposit to be a payment service. 

This conclusion is based on a literal, systematic and teleological interpretation, which will be examined in more detail and critically questioned, from a German regulatory law perspective, below.

The advocate general’s legal analysis

Literal interpretation

According to Art. 4 point (3) in conjunction with Annex I, point 3(c) PSD2, the term “payment service” covers the execution of payment transactions, including the transfer of funds to a payment account by “executing credit transfers, including standing orders”. 

In the opinion of the DNB, Betaal, as an intermediary, executes the transfer of funds from the customer (payer) to the contractor (payee) and, thus, provides a payment service. 

The advocate general disagrees, stating that Betaal does not maintain any payment accounts in the name of its customers, a prerequisite for credit transfer services. Instead, Betaal holds the funds in a payment account in its own name (without the ability to trade or profit from those funds) and is an intermediary in a transaction characterized by two separate payments: first from the customer to Betaal and then from Betaal to the contractor. 

The advocate general further argues that “execution of payment transactions” implies technical involvement with the payment accounts when making the transfer, which in Betaal’s case would be carried out by the banks which supply the accounts and not by Betaal itself.

Finally, according to Art. 80(1) PSD2, the payment order should be irrevocable. Yet in Betaal’s case, the customer could cancel the payment if it was not satisfied with the completion of the building work meaning it would not qualify as a payment service. 

Systematic interpretation

The advocate general goes on to state that Betaal is not a payment institution because its main activity is not the commercial provision of payment services. In his view, this “main activity” requirement can be derived from the provisions of PSD2 itself, the legislative context of the Directive and the stringent obligations placed on payment institutions, which can only be justified if payment services are provided on a commercial basis and as a main activity. Betaal’s main activity, on the other hand, is the provision of services in the field of real estate collateral. 

To support his thesis of a general ancillary activity privilege, the advocate general cites the Rasool decision of the ECJ (ECJ, judgment of March 22, 2018, C-568/18), which was issued under Directive 2007/64/EC (Payment Services Directive—PSD). 

In the Rasool case, a gaming arcade operator installed ATMs that were operated entirely by a third-party provider. The arcade operator only filled them with cash but had no influence on the flow of payments. The withdrawal of money was not necessary for their business but merely conducive to it, meaning that it was an ancillary service under PSD. 

Teleological interpretation

DNB had emphasized PSD2’s consumer protection objective, citing recital 6, which refers to the need for “a high level of consumer protection in the use of” payment services. In its view, this requires a broad interpretation of payment services. 

In the advocate general’s opinion, such a broad interpretation cannot be distinguished meaningfully from other services that are not covered by PSD2. In support of his position, the advocate general observes that national competent authorities do not apply PSD2 to lawyers and notaries providing transfer or custody of funds or provision of security deposits because those activities are not their main activity. By extension, the advocate general considers the same logic must apply to companies such as Betaal. 

Money remittance business

The advocate general also addresses the Norwegian government’s argument that Betaal’s business model is a money remittance business. In his opinion, the business model lacks the immediacy and unconditionality characteristic of simple money remittance transactions. This, according to the advocate general, is also supported by the fact that Betaal retains a fee when forwarding the security deposit to the contractor; the provision of these services must also be commercial in nature and constitute the main activity.

Concluding opinion

The advocate general concludes that Art. 4 point (3) in conjunction with Annex I, point (3)(c) PSD2 should be interpreted as meaning that,

“a service entailing the receipt and forwarding of funds, provided by an entity as an intermediary, does not constitute a payment service if, in the context of a contract concluded with a client and a contractor, that entity receives the client’s funds in its payment account and, after the client has given its consent, transfers those funds from that payment account to the contractor”.

First thoughts on the advocate general’s arguments 

The advocate general’s opinion clashes with parts of the current legislative implementation of the PSD2 and the corresponding administrative practice in Germany. In particular, this applies to the German implementation and interpretation of the scope of application of the money remittance business within the meaning of Sec. 1(1) sentence 2 No. 6 of the German Payment Services Supervisory Act (Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz—ZAG).

In light of the guidance of the German regulator, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht—BaFin), Betaal’s provided service would likely qualify as money remittance business pursuant to Sec. 1(1) sentence 2 No. 6 ZAG. 

Relying on the preparatory legislative reasoning for Sec. 1(1) sentence 2 No. 6 ZAG, BaFin traditionally interprets the scope of application of the money remittance business broadly, allocating to it the function of a “catch-all provision” for the transfer of funds by order. 

In this regard, BaFin states expressly that the ZAG does not provide for a general exemption for ancillary activities and that, hence, the requirement to obtain a license or registration for payment services is not eliminated by the mere fact that these services are provided solely as an ancillary activity to another activity outside the financial sector. 

That said, BaFin applies an unwritten exception to this principle according to which selected professionals, such as lawyers and public notaries, can transfer funds between parties as long as such transfers remain within the scope of the duties typical of their profession and as defined in their professional codes of conduct. Whilst this exception used to be codified in the PSD, it was not continued within the PSD2. 

In any event, the advocate general’s opinion goes far beyond this (unwritten) exemption. Moreover, the ECJ’s Rasool decision, cited by the advocate general, can hardly justify a general ancillary activity privilege as (i) it was delivered under PSD; and (ii) the arcade operator in the Rasool case performed only preparatory acts in advance of the actual provision of payment services, i.e., they were not directly involved in the flow of payments.

Despite the wording of the PSD2, BaFin reiterates the German legislator’s reasoning for the scope of application of Sec. 1(1) sentence 2 No. 6 ZAG by stating that it is irrelevant whether the parties involved in the payment transaction pursue any purposes beyond the mere transfer of the funds. 

Outlook from a German regulatory law point of view 

If the ECJ were to follow the advocate general’s arguments, the consequences for the German payment services practice could be profound.

As a direct consequence of a binding decision, a significant change to the scope of application of payment services under the PSD2, especially the money remittance business, would have to be expected. BaFin would likely be forced to narrow its interpretation of the application scope of payment services such as the money remittance business. Whole market areas might consequently fall out of the scope of an authorization requirement under the ZAG, e.g., facilities, escrow, and paying agents, having incurred extensive costs for obtaining authorizations and setting up and maintaining the required proper organization of their businesses.

Against this backdrop, it is entirely unclear how the national legislators would react to such a paradigm shift (the advocate general does indeed propose a national regulation of service providers that would fall outside the scope of the PSD2 following such a new interpretation of payment services). Furthermore, uncertainties would remain regarding the interpretation of other payment services not covered by this decision.

Irrespective of the outcome, the case at hand offers the ECJ the opportunity to further harmonize the member states’ rather diverse administrative practices in the payment services market. A ruling is expected in the coming months.

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