Three-year performance stock unit awards (PSUs) featuring total shareholder return (TSR) metrics (sometimes combined with operating measures) have dominated long-term incentive compensation plan design as companies seek to shield against criticism from proxy advisors and avoid less than fully supportive say-on-pay votes.
Although three-year performance-based share awards remain standard in executive pay packages, some companies may consider diverging from the status quo by reexamining how to best promote alignment between executives and long-term shareholder value creation. Shifting from a standardized compliance-driven design to a more tailored one may take some courage (and increased shareholder engagement efforts), but recent developments suggest there could be leeway for companies to act more boldly.
Longer-term time-based awards as an alignment tool
Many constituencies, including boards, compensation consultants and institutional investors, have criticized the inherent opacity of operating metrics that, in tandem with TSR, drive many three-year performance award targets.
For instance, Norges Bank Investment Management, the manager of Norway’s largest sovereign wealth fund, has long advocated for long-term shareholding by executives, noting that PSU targets can be too complex and may not align fully with corporate aims.2 It argues that performance-based long-term incentive awards can lead to outsized pay if left uncapped, can frequently be subject to discretion during the performance period to rebalance metrics, undermining their rigor, and can leave a company vulnerable to executives jumping ship if it appears that performance targets may be missed too soon in a cycle absent adjustments.3
In November 2025, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) changed course with a formal policy change for the 2026 proxy season, indicating that it no longer expects a majority of equity grants to have performance-based vesting targets.4 Under the recalibrated ISS approach, time-based awards with extended vesting schedules will be viewed as a positive factor in ISS’ pay-for-performance evaluation.
ISS has indicated that the extended time-based vesting horizon can be demonstrated through the use of five-year or longer vesting tails, four-year vesting tails plus one-year post-vesting or post-exercise share retention requirements covering at least 75% of the net underlying shares (or even three-year vesting periods with similar two-year post-vesting or post-exercise net share retention requirements).5
This suggests that a sufficiently long vesting period may be effective in discouraging short-term turnover and promoting retention, without requiring a board to select a performance metric that may diminish in significance as corporate goals evolve.
Glass Lewis has moved in a similar direction, though without adopting specific extended vesting period thresholds comparable to those of ISS. Glass Lewis’ 2026 guidelines note that indicative markers of “well-structured” long-term incentive plans include vesting periods of at least three years and post-vesting holding periods to encourage long-term executive share ownership.6 Taken together, these updated policies reflect more mainstream acceptance of time-based equity designs that emphasize long-term retention and ownership alignment.
Given the timing of this change in ISS’s position, we did not see a drastic uptick in the prevalence of extended time-based awards wash over the market in this year’s disclosure cycle, either as a supplement to or substitution for traditionally dominant performance-based awards. Nonetheless, this more tempered posture could foreshadow an expansion of the public company executive compensation toolkit this upcoming proxy season through the renewed use of extended time-based awards as an undercurrent to existing performance-based programs.
This year, Amazon, whose executives have long been compensated principally in time-based restricted stock unit awards (RSUs) that vest over five years or more, commended ISS’s policy revisions on extended time-based awards in its Compensation Discussion and Analysis, citing studies and statistics on how these designs best anchor executive pay to long-term shareholder value creation.7
It remains to be seen whether companies and their boards will make more room for extended time-based vesting (and post-vesting holding) components in their executive compensation programs. For companies navigating the often murky waters of pay design, shifting guidance from proxy advisory firms may make the broader use of time-based awards with longer vesting and/or retention tails an increasingly attractive complement to performance-based awards.
One of a kind: bespoke performance metrics and special awards
Although our review of public disclosures shows that traditional financial measures such as TSR and EBITDA remain bedrocks of annual and performance-based incentive awards, some companies have charted their own course by replacing or supplementing existing performance metrics with more tailored operational and strategic measures.
The most striking illustration of these unorthodox performance metrics in the past year has been Elon Musk’s widely reported compensation awards at both Tesla and SpaceX. In November 2025, Tesla shareholders approved a “moonshot” performance award in the form of restricted shares that could be valued at up to USD1 trillion if all its performance milestones are achieved.8
The award is structured in 12 performance tranches, each requiring Tesla to reach a specified market capitalization milestone paired with a specific operational milestone. The operational milestones include the delivery of 20 million Tesla vehicles, deploying one million Robotaxis in commercial operation and reaching 10 million active full self-driving subscriptions, among others.9
SpaceX’s board approved a separate compensation plan covering Mr. Musk in January 2026 that awarded him a “Mars-shot” of up to 1 billion super-voting performance-based restricted shares that vest in 15 equal tranches if SpaceX reaches a specified market capitalization target and establishes a permanent self-sustaining human colony on Mars with at least one million inhabitants.10
A second tranche of up to approximately 300 million restricted shares will vest if SpaceX meets market capitalization goals and operates data centers in space that deliver at least 100 terawatts of compute capacity.11 These awards have no vesting timeline, but Mr. Musk must still be providing services to SpaceX at the time the performance milestones are met in order for the awards to vest.
Gamestop’s board also granted a unique award to its chair and CEO, subject to shareholder approval, in the form of stock options in January 2026, vesting in nine tranches tied to operational and market-capitalization targets; the proposal to approve the award was withdrawn in June 2026 and removed from GameStop’s annual proxy statement at the CEO’s request.12
While not examples of broader market practice, these outlier pay packages illustrate both the potential benefits and the intense scrutiny associated with the implementation of bespoke performance metrics and compensation designs.
Companies considering testing these waters, particularly for outsized awards to controlling stockholders or insiders, should follow a robust, well-documented and storm-tested approval process, including independent compensation consultant benchmarking and negotiation and approval by a committee of disinterested, independent directors (or a fully informed vote of the disinterested stockholders).
Clear waters also remain key for corporate governance stakeholders, and companies are well advised to pair any new bespoke arrangements with transparent, “plain-language disclosure” and “disciplined documentation” to assuage potential concerns from investors and proxy advisors.13
“Special” and “one-time” mega awards are other tools that companies may selectively leverage to address circumstances that traditional incentive programs and ordinary metrics may not capture.
The use of these awards has grown markedly in recent times, with the percentage of S&P 500 companies issuing such one-time awards nearly doubling over the past decade (15.8% in 2016 compared to 29.4% in 2026).14 These can take the form of special equity grants, transaction awards or a combination of awards, designed to address a singular event or set of circumstances, rather than to replace recurring compensation practices.
There are a variety of rationales commonly cited for one-time and special awards extending beyond the retention of key employees. These include rewarding corporate transformations such as mergers or technology overhauls and addressing succession and CEO-transition tenures.15
For example, BNY granted its chair and CEO a one-time award of restricted stock units and stock options that vest in equal installments on the fifth and sixth anniversaries of grant, citing the importance of leadership continuity amid a competitive landscape and market developments regarding CEO compensation, and Sysco granted its chair and CEO as well as its interim CFO one-time awards of PSUs, which are contingent on the closing of a pending acquisition, to ensure leadership continuity and facilitate integration.
Companies granting special or one-time awards should take the helm early to get ahead of outside pressures by disclosing the awards’ rationale, proactively engaging with investors and proxy advisors and considering whether the significant size of these awards warrants reducing an executive’s standard annual equity award package in the years following a special award grant.
The head of ISS Analytics, ISS’ data intelligence arm, has described the granting of special awards without explanation or justification as one of the seven “venial sins” of executive compensation (i.e., compensation practices most often associated with adverse say-on-pay vote outcomes).16
As with bespoke metrics, companies granting special or one-time awards are recommended to support the need for these grants by providing clear disclosure of both the rationale for the need for these awards and the process relied on by compensation committees and their advisors to determine the scope and size of these awards.
Some trends in incentive plan design
In our 2025 Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Survey, we noted a clear decline in diversity- or inclusion-related operational metrics and modifiers in incentive plans.17 This trend persisted in 2026, as U.S. companies continued to unmoor themselves from metrics explicitly related to diversity, equity and inclusion.
Meanwhile, language related to artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to creep into incentive disclosures, albeit on a limited basis. Although we have not yet seen a widespread emergence of AI-related performance measures in the design of incentive programs, some companies are starting to link AI to their broader transformation objectives and individual performance assessments.18
Many companies are still developing their long-term value strategies around AI. The rapid pace of change in this area may exacerbate the already notable difficulties in establishing multi-year performance criteria. As the proliferation of AI tools continues,19 we expect to see a deluge of activity in this space this proxy season.
Our take
Our review of disclosures of performance metrics and executive compensation design in the 2026 proxy season has not revealed a complete sea change. Nonetheless, given technological advancements and regulatory priorities, we expect that different pay-design structures may gain ground.
As we look ahead to the next proxy season, companies that are considering changes to their compensation programs should start with a deeper dive into the business case rather than just a review of market practice.
Long-term pay design should reflect the company’s strategy, how well it can forecast performance in this dynamic environment, its talent needs and its shareholder base, as well as market practice. For example, long-vesting RSUs may best suit companies with long business cycles, cyclical businesses, low executive turnover or a strong annual bonus plan that already sets clear priorities. Compensation consultants play a key role in helping companies assess appropriate pay design.
Once the threshold review is complete, proxy advisor policy modeling and shareholder engagement will be important. When testing potential investor reactions, several alternatives should be presented rather than a sole design option. Companies should be ready to weather the storm of tough questions on how proposed compensation programs better foster alignment of executive incentives with shareholder interests while maintaining management accountability.
Under the current disclosure regime, multi-year modeling may be necessary to show changes in compensation quantum potentially payable to a company’s named executive officers during any transition in programmatic compensation design.
Then, all compliance boxes must be checked. Questions that advisors should ask include:
- Is there adequate capacity in the equity plan?
- What are the accounting consequences of the changes?
- What does disclosure look like, including Section 16 reporting, current reporting on Form 8-K and required proxy tables?
- How do the awards work on a change in control, or in the event of a clawback?
- Do participant and stock plan administrator communications need updating as well?
Finally, companies must explain the changes and the reasoning clearly and maintain sufficient board records that reflect expert advice and an independent approval process, which would be the main defenses if their decision-making is challenged. Truly courageous compensation will have little benchmarking support. Process matters, so an independent, conflict-free committee with access to its own advisors who can also constructively engage with management from the outset of the process will be a key ingredient of success.
Companies should also be mindful of promised changes in the SEC’s disclosure requirements that may pare back certain line-item requirements, perhaps easing the way for potential experimentation in compensation design.
Footnotes
1. See, Ani Huang and Charles G. Tharp, “The Debate on Performance Shares—Who Has It Right,” Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Jan. 27, 2026) (noting a dramatic increase in performance-based equity among S&P 500 companies from 2012 onward and present widespread use of total shareholder return and three-year performance periods in long-term incentive plans); see, also Voytek Sokolowski, “Beyond the PSU Mandate,” FW Cook (Mar. 16, 2026), https://fwcook.com/beyond-the-psu-mandate/ (noting a current long-term incentive mix among public companies to be dominated by performance share units with three-year performance periods).
2. Norges Bank Investment Management, “CEO remuneration,” (last accessed Oct. 28, 2026).
3. Id.
4. ISS, “United States Executive Compensation Policies Frequently Asked Questions,” Q&A 35 (updated Dec. 9, 2025).
5. Id.
6. See, Glass Lewis, “2026 Benchmark Policy Guidelines – United States” (last accessed Sept. 9, 2026).
7. Amazon.com, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 50 (filed Apr. 9, 2026).
8. Tesla, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed Nov. 7, 2025); See, also Meridian Compensation Partners, “Tesla Shareholders Approve 2025 CEO Performance Award” (Nov. 13, 2025). Recent developments in Delaware may ease the path for similar awards to controlling stockholders. In 2025, Delaware Senate Bill 21 (SB 21) amended the Delaware General Corporation Law to bar claims for equitable relief and damages arising out of controlling stockholder transactions (other than going-private transactions) if the transaction is approved either in good faith by a properly empowered committee of disinterested directors or by an informed, uncoerced majority-of-the-minority stockholder vote, rather than requiring both under the previous standard. In February 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of SB 21. See, Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Grp. LLC, No. 248, 2025, 2026 WL 548504 (Del. Feb. 27, 2026).
9. Tesla, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 61 (filed Sept. 17, 2025).
10. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) Ex. 10.6 (Class B Restricted Stock Award Agreement) (filed May 20, 2026).
11. Id.
12. GameStop Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed Jan. 7, 2026); GameStop Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed Jan. 8, 2026) (attaching CEO option award agreement); GameStop Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed June 23, 2026) (announcing withdrawal of the award). Another example is Rivian’s pre-IPO CEO option grant, which was later canceled and replaced in 2025, as targets were unlikely to be met. See, Rivian Automotive, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed Nov. 7, 2025).
13. See, Erik Nelson and Michael Bowie, “Executive pay trends in 2026: Proxy insights on CEO pay, incentives and governance under pressure,” Willis Towers Watson (May 8, 2026).
14. Frederic Lee, “One-Time Awards Have Doubled over the Last Decade — What Have Directors Learned?” Agenda (Oct. 26, 2026).
15. The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed Dec. 11, 2025); Sysco Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (filed Sept. 4, 2026).
16. John Roe, “Seven Venial Sins of Executive Compensation,” Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (May 21, 2019).
17. See, our prior article “Evolving trends in human capital practices and disclosures,” A&O Shearman, Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey 2025.
18. See, Pat Haggerty, “AI in Incentive Plans: Opportunity, Risk, and the Role of the Compensation Committee,” Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (June 27, 2026).
19. See, Dan Tinkoff et al., “The state of AI in 2026: On the road to ROI,” McKinsey & Company (Aug. 25, 2026).