U.S. Supreme Court expands Presidential control over independent agencies

On June 29, 2026, in Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the Federal Trade Commission’s “for-cause” removal provision violated the Constitution’s separation of powers. Later that same day, in a 5-4 decision in Trump v. Cook, No. 25A312, the Court upheld the Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” removal provision finding the Federal Reserve’s “unique historical status and role” within the national economy dispositive.  

Slaughter substantially weakens statutory insulation for officials of multimember agencies who exercise executive power, holding they may be removed by the President at will, and will likely increase the degree to which Commissioners at so-called “independent agencies,” like the Securities & Exchange Commission and Federal Communications Commission respond to an administration’s priorities and political pressures.  

Slaughter background 

In March 2025, President Trump fired two Democratic-appointed FTC Commissioners – Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya – despite a statute providing that FTC Commissioners serve seven-year terms and may be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” ¹  

President Trump fired both Commissioners stating only that their continued service was “inconsistent with [his] Administration’s priorities” without alleging inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.²   

Slaughter filed suit and the United States District court for the District of Columbia ruled in her favor, finding the outcome controlled by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which held that dismissal of an FTC Commissioner on policy grounds was not permitted under the statute.³ On the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Slaughter’s motion, denied the Government’s motion, and permanently enjoined the President’s interference with Slaughter’s duties.⁴ The district court later denied the Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal⁵ and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed.⁶  

Slaughter decision 

In a 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the FTC’s for-cause removal protection under 15 U.S.C. § 41 is unconstitutional because the FTC exercises executive power and must therefore be subject to the President as chief executive.⁷   

Grounding its decision in “text, history, and structure,” the Court articulated that Article II of the Constitution vests executive power in the President alone, and subordinates who execute federal law must remain removable at will.⁸ The Court found further support in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which established that the President’s removal power cannot be impeded by  requiring the consent of the Senate.  

The Court also overruled its decision in Humphrey’s Executor finding that it’s reasoning never stood on solid ground, was inconsistent with prior and subsequent caselaw, and was unworkable.⁹ The Court rejected Humphrey’s characterization of the FTC as “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” concluding: “When an agency ‘executes’ a congressional mandate against private parties, it exercises executive power – no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.” 

Implications of Slaughter 

The implications of Slaughter are significant for executive agencies that bring investigations, enforcement actions, and promulgate rules. The decision clears the way for at-will termination of term executive officials and will likely accelerate alignment of agency priorities with an incoming administration’s objectives. 

Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence recognized this reality, noting that, under this ruling, agencies will retain their legislative and adjudicative powers while becoming more directly controlled by the President, thus concentrating greater regulatory power in the President.¹⁰

The Court’s majority intentionally left open questions regarding entities with functions traditionally handled outside the Executive Branch and tenure protections for Article III courts.¹¹ Notably, the Court expressly identified the Federal Reserve as an institution that may follow the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States foreshadowing the Cook decision issued later that day. 

Overall, Slaughter announced a broad rule for agencies exercising executive power with a limited window for select exceptions. 

Cook background and decision 

In Cook, President Trump attempted to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook after a news article alleged that she had made false statements in connection with  mortgage applications and agreements.¹² Following publication, the President posted on social media “Cook must resign, now!!!” and three days later sent a termination letter citing potential “gross negligence.”¹³   

Cook filed suit alleging that her removal was not “for cause” as required by statute.¹⁴ The United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction preventing her removal from office, finding Cook’s claims likely to succeed on the merits.¹⁵ The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declined the Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal and the case reached the Supreme Court on the Government’s application for a stay.¹⁶

In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court took care to note it was not deciding whether Cook could ultimately be removed but moved beyond the stay question to hold that the Federal Reserve should not be subject to political interference, declining to strike down the Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” removal provision.¹⁷

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the President’s determination of “cause” is unreviewable, holding that the Federal Reserve Act’s requirement that a Governor hold office for fourteen years “unless sooner removed for cause by the President,” does not grant at-will removal authority.¹⁸ The Court also rejected the Government’s contention that the “for cause” standard was a low bar and that Cook could be removed while litigation was pending.¹⁹

Looking ahead 

How often new administrations will choose to shake-up independent agencies, as President Trump has preferred to do, remains to be seen. But regulated entities should expect more frequent leadership changes at independent agencies, which will require agencies to more quickly shift enforcement and rulemaking priorities. Agencies such as the SEC, CFPB, NLRB, and FCC – all of which exercise executive power through enforcement actions and rulemaking – are now likely subject to at-will presidential removal of their heads under Slaughter’s framework. Although Cook demonstrates that agency-specific exceptions remain possible where an institution’s historical role and structure warrant insulation, that exception is narrow and was grounded in the Federal Reserve’s unique lineage tracing back to the First and Second Banks of the United States.

Companies operating in heavily regulated industries should reassess their government-affairs strategies and prepare for the possibility that enforcement postures may shift more rapidly with changes in administration.