UK Pensions in dispute—July 2026

High Court grants rectification to remove “Courage” restriction

The High Court has granted rectification of scheme rules to allow removal of a Courage-style restriction: Soufflet Bairds Malt Ltd & Anor v. Dear [2026] EWHC 1480 (Ch). The scheme had been administered on the basis that it had been closed to accrual since March 31, 2010. However, deeds entered into in 2004 and 2012 introduced a proviso to the amendment power protecting benefits “already accrued or secured”. This operated as a Courage-type fetter that arguably meant the closure to accrual did not break members’ final salary link.

The judge approved rectification to remove the proviso wording. He took into account a range of “particularly compelling” evidence, including the following:

• Explanatory guides prepared by the scheme’s professional advisers did not identify the introduction of any new fetter.
• The broader context—the scheme was expensive to fund and the employer’s financial position was poor—meant that introducing a fetter would have been surprising and would have prompted discussion at trustee or board level; there was no record of such discussion.
• The proviso language was based on the legal adviser’s precedent, not specific to the scheme.
• Events after execution—the final salary link was treated by both the employer and the trustee as a matter for negotiation, not as an entrenched entitlement.

Soufflet Bairds Malt Ltd & Anor v. Dear

What does this ruling mean for trustees?

Errors in rule amendments and consolidations are a common cause of issues, often only discovered years later. The clear evidence in this case allowed the court to permit a rectification. Trustees should ensure that discussions, decisions and reasons for amendments are carefully recorded and retained, so that the intention can be established if uncertainties are raised later.

Ineffective forfeiture rule

The Pensions Ombudsman (TPO) has found that provisions in a trust deed labelled “forfeiture” did not, in fact, allow forfeiture of benefits.

Mrs P had incorrectly had her pension in the Plan stopped and should have received payments for 19 years, up to her death. The trustees of the scheme agreed to pay a one-off lump sum to Mrs P's estate representing six years of excess pension and eight years of guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) arrears.

The trustees believed that unclaimed benefits beyond those periods could be forfeited under a discretionary forfeiture power. Mrs P’s representative argued that the full 19 years of payments should be paid.

TPO conducted a comparison between the scheme’s forfeiture clause and the clause considered in Axminster Carpets (Punter Southall Governance Services Limited Group Pension Trust Ltd v. Jonathan Hazlett). The operative wording of both clauses was “strikingly similar”, providing that monies unclaimed within six years may, at the trustees’ discretion, be used for the purposes of the Plan. In Axminster, the court found that such wording did not amount to language which forfeits or deprives a member of their entitlement to benefits and was therefore not effective as a forfeiture clause.

TPO considered whether differences in the wording in this plan warranted a different outcome. Most significantly, clause headings in this case included the word “forfeiture” (unlike the Axminster clause). The deed did not contain any interpretive wording to suggest that headings were only illustrative (which is commonly included), so TPO did take the heading into account in the interpretation, but concluded that the heading alone was insufficient to overcome the absence of operative forfeiture language in the body of the clause. The trustees were directed to pay the full outstanding balance of Mrs P’s pension and GMP, plus interest.

CAS-85140-P4M5

What does this ruling mean for trustees?

This case highlights the importance of reading forfeiture language (and all trust deed and rules wording) carefully before using it. While each set of rules should be considered on a case-by-case basis, any analysis should take into account similarities/distinctions with examples in case law.

IDRP decision maker not objective

In another TPO case, Mr Y argued that he should have been awarded an ill health pension after he was found to have been unfairly dismissed. Part of the complaint related to whether the Internal Dispute Resolution Procedure (IDRP) decision-maker—Ms S—who had rejected Mr Y’s complaint should have been allowed to take the decision. There were various historic interactions between Mr Y and Ms S, including complaints and grievances lodged against each other and Ms S having been involved in Mr Y’s dismissal process in an HR capacity.

TPO agreed that Ms S was not, on an objective basis, and could not reasonably consider herself to be, independent. This led to an award of GBP500 for distress and inconvenience (with GBP1000 being awarded for other elements of the complaint).

CAS-37680-Q4L8

What does this ruling mean for trustees?

This serves as a good reminder to carefully consider whether a decision-maker is appropriate. In this case, there was a specific requirement for the decision maker to be independent and “not have been involved in any capacity in the decision against which the member is appealing”. However, the question of whether a decision-maker is appropriately objective to be able to take a decision, and whether there are processes in place to identify any relevant background which might mean they are not, is relevant for all schemes.