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UK antitrust regime set for further reform as government pushes growth agenda

UK antitrust regime set for further reform as government pushes growth agenda
The UK government is consulting on highly anticipated amendments to the antitrust legislative framework. Its proposals are aimed at delivering economic growth by supporting the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)’s 4Ps objectives: to improve pace, predictability, proportionality, and process of engagement. Described as “refinements”, they span across the merger control, markets, antitrust, and consumer protection regimes. Some build on changes introduced last year by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA).

Others are much more radical.

The proposals stress the government’s desire to enhance the CMA’s accountability to parliament “while safeguarding CMA independence from government in its mergers and markets decision-making.” However, the mooted abolition of the independent CMA panelan important check in the CMA decision-making processmay well see that increased accountability coming at the expense of independence from government influence. The fact that the proposals have come almost exactly one year to the day since the UK Chancellor ousted the CMA Chair for failing to share “the strategic direction that this government are taking” will not help to allay those concerns.

Businesses can expect the government to move quickly to implement the changes. It will bring forward legislation that incorporates responses to the consultation “as soon as Parliamentary time allows.”

There are five key proposals.

1. Greater certainty on when mergers will be subject to investigation

The UK’s “share of supply” and “material influence” jurisdictional tests are notoriously expansive and have faced heavy criticism.

The government is proposing to place boundaries around the CMA’s jurisdictional reach by:

  • share of supply: limiting the assessment to a defined set of criteriavalue, cost, price, quantity, capacity, and number of workers employedwhich could be revisited if new antitrust challenges arise in the future
  • material influence and de facto control: establishing a closed list of factors that the CMA can consider (which also could be revisited):
    • Shareholding or voting rights thresholds (e.g., at least 15%), or any shareholding or voting rights in combination with other factors
    • Board representation or appointment rights
    • Special voting rights or veto rights over strategic decisions
    • Access to confidential strategic information
    • Commercial, financial, or consultancy arrangements.

In both cases, the government’s proposals put the CMA’s current practice on a statutory footing. The government says this should improve predictability.

The changes, combined with recently updated CMA guidance providing clarity around its approach to these tests and the fact that merging parties can engage with the CMA on jurisdictional questions via a briefing paper, should give businesses more certainty on whether their transactions will be subject to UK review.

In contrast, the existing jurisdictional tests will be maintained for the Secretary of State in public interest intervention cases.

2. Allowing more time to agree phase 1 merger remedies

To avoid what it calls “near misses” on remedies, the government is proposing to double the statutory period for the CMA to consider merger remedies where it has found antitrust concerns after a phase 1 review.

This would give the authority up to 20 working days from its phase 1 decision to assess whether to accept (in principle) the parties’ remedy proposals.

Merging parties would still need to submit a remedy proposal by working day five. However, the CMA would have discretion to grant the merging parties a five-working day extension to further develop their proposals where there is a reasonable prospect of resolving concerns at phase 1.

This proposal will increase the chances of addressing antitrust issues without a long, intensive phase 2 review.

However, recent CMA decisions have illustrated the need for merging parties to engage with the CMA on remedies early in the phase 1 process, especially where the conditions are complex and/or involve behavioural commitments.

The legislative change would complement the CMA’s new approach to merger remedies, finalised late in 2025, which should offer merging parties more routes to obtaining merger control clearance, even for deals raising antitrust concerns.

Of relevance to review periods more generally, and in a welcome move, the government has also suggested pausing statutory time-limits over the Christmas holidays.

3. Changing how decisions are made in phase 2 mergers and market investigations

The government is proposing to abolish and replace the independent panel-led groups that currently make decisions in phase 2 merger and market investigations with new sub-committees of the CMA Board.

The revised model—based on the decision-making model under the new digital markets regime—will enhance the CMA Board’s involvement and, importantly, its accountability for these significant decision-making functions.

According to the government, CMA Board representation should enhance consistency and predictability in decision making and result in a smoother transition into phase 2 merger reviews that could potentially improve the speed of decisions.

Crucially, sub-committees will include individuals picked from an expert pool of non-CMA staff decision-makers to maintain the expertise and diversity of experience provided by the current panel members.

In explaining the reasoning behind this proposal, the government has noted a concern that “the senior leaders of the [CMA] who are accountable to Parliament for its performance are legally prevented from engaging in two of its most significant decision-making functions.”

However, it is precisely that division of CMA decision-making responsibility that helps to guard against legitimate government influence at the strategic and policy levels from spilling into government interference in CMA operational decisions.

The timing of the proposals is significant. The fact that they have been released almost one year to the day since the UK Chancellor’s ousting of the CMA Chair for failing to share “the strategic direction that this government are taking” will not help to allay those concerns.

The proposed change is tempting. It removes the eccentricity of the CMA leadership having no say in its most significant decisions.

But it also removes an important check and balance in the system. A bolder reform would have been to switch from an administrative to a judicial system, especially for mergers, cutting through the political influence concerns and the due process contortions involved in the CMA investigating and deciding its own cases.

Interestingly, the government is also consulting on extending the CMA’s obligation to seek formal secretary of state approval to a wider range of CMA guidance documents.

4. Streamlining the markets regime

Recent reforms under the DMCCA have resulted in significant improvements to the markets regime.

However, the government believes more can be achieved.

Most significantly, it is proposing a move to a single-phase market review tool, removing the potential inefficiencies of separate market studies and investigations processes.

This will reduce the length of time markets are under review. The government proposes a statutory time limit of 24 months (extendable up to an additional six months in certain circumstances). However, it predicts that the end-to-end process will in most cases take between 18 – 24 months and in some cases considerably less than this range. This compares to a current duration that can stretch over three years.

The government notes that the single-phase tool will also provide greater flexibility, allowing the CMA to tailor the process to the specific nature of the markets involved or the specific harms and remedies that may be under consideration.

In addition, the government intends to legislate to:

  • formalise the CMA’s commitment to impose sunset clauses in remedies by defaultwhere the CMA judges that remedies should not fall away after a set period, it will be required to set out its reasoning
  • require the CMA to review remedies within ten years of the relevant final report and again within ten years of that initial reviewcomplementing the CMA’s current review of 33 market remedies
  • grant the CMA discretion as to whether to launch a market review on the recommendation of a sector regulator—the CMA would be required to consider the request and respond within a set time frame
  • permit sector regulators to oversee market remedies that have been imposed or accepted in their sectors and require the CMA to consult sector regulators on the design of remedies

5. Boosting antitrust and consumer powers to scrutinise algorithms

Alive to concerns that algorithms may be misused in ways that breach antitrust and consumer protection laws, the government plans to grant the CMA stronger investigative powers. This includes requiring individuals to:

  • obtain or generate information on algorithms (including simulated outputs or data not already held)
  • vary their usual conduct (e.g., altering how services or digital content are presented to users)
  • perform a specified demonstration or test

What next?

The government’s consultation closes on March 31, 2026. We will continue to monitor developments and keep you updated on the legislative outcome as well as how the CMA adapts its approach across its antitrust toolkit.

Antitrust remains a hot topic around the globe as governments and authorities adapt to evolving risks. Watch out for our upcoming reports on global trends in merger control enforcement and global antitrust enforcement where we analyse the direction of travel.

 

 

 

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