Italian Antitrust Authority fines snack producers for market sharing in the private label retail channel

The Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) has fined Amica Chips, Pata and Preziosi Food more than EUR23 million for an anticompetitive agreement relating to the supply of savory snacks produced for large-scale retailers and sold under retailers’ private labels. 

The case concerned market sharing in the Italian large scale retail distribution (grande distribuzione organizzata, GDO) channel, including non-aggression arrangements, allocation of retailer customers in tender processes and exchanges of sensitive information on cost increases, and related price requests. 

It is notable as the IAA’s first use of the settlement procedure, and as a clear example of several current enforcement trends: continued action against classic horizontal cartels, closer scrutiny of information exchange, focus on consumer and agri-food supply chains, use of leniency (which in the last few years had seen a drop-off), and growing reliance on whistleblowers and procurement-related detection tools.

The infringement: market sharing in GDO tenders

The investigation was triggered by a whistleblower report (from a common buyer) that, at the outset, was limited to 2024 private label crisps and price proposals to GDO buyers. However, inspections and subsequent evidence led the IAA to identify a broader cartel covering private label savory snacks in the GDO channel from 2016. 

For Amica Chips and Pata, the IAA found a wider pact not to actively target GDO customers already served by the other party for the relevant private label products, initially for selected customers and, from 2018, progressively across GDO chains requesting private label supplies. 

For all three companies, the IAA identified a common core of conduct consisting of the allocation of individual GDO chains when retailers sought offers for products already supplied by one cartel participant. 

In practical terms, the parties sought to preserve each other’s positions in retailer procurement processes through coordinated offers or, in some cases, by abstaining from bidding. 

The IAA also found systematic exchanges of information concerning a significant increase in production costs in 2022 and related price increases requested from GDO customers. 

The IAA concluded that those exchanges reduced uncertainty between competitors and supported the market-sharing arrangement at a sensitive point in pricing negotiations with retailers. 

This decision is consistent with broader enforcement trends, highlighted in our 2026 Global antitrust enforcement report. In particular:

Customer allocation and tender coordination

Traditional cartel enforcement remains firmly in scope, particularly where competitors allocate customers or coordinate bidding behavior. The context of a GDO tender is also relevant because antitrust authorities are increasingly targeting procurement-related coordination and investing in tools to detect bid-rigging patterns. 

Information exchange

Antitrust authorities are cracking down on anticompetitive exchanges of price and other strategic information, including disclosures that reduce uncertainty and facilitate alignment.

Consumer-facing and agri-food markets

Antitrust authorities continue to focus on consumer and food supply chains, including large-scale retail distribution in Italy. 

For suppliers, the key message is that private label negotiations with retailers are not a lower-risk environment from an antitrust perspective. 

Non-solicitation understandings, customer-allocation arrangements and exchanges on cost-related price responses may constitute “by object” restrictions where they replace independent commercial decision-making with coordination among competitors.

Soft enforcement: first IAA settlement

The IAA’s decision is also significant procedurally: it marks the IAA’s first use of the settlement procedure in an antitrust investigation since Article 14-quater of Law No. 287/1990 was introduced in 2022. 

Under this procedure, parties may obtain a fine reduction of between 10% and 20% in exchange for acknowledging liability and waving subsequent procedural steps. 

Here, all parties settled and obtained a 10% reduction, which, for Amica Chips and Pata, was applied cumulatively with the reductions granted under the leniency program: Pata received a 50% leniency reduction (for an overall 60% reduction) and Amica Chips a 30% leniency reduction (for an overall 40% reduction), reflecting their respective evidentiary contributions to proving the infringement and extending its temporal scope.

These considerable sanction reductions have already prompted public criticism: consumer association Codacons called for the parties to the agreement to be punished “with the utmost severity,” arguing that anticompetitive agreements ultimately harm consumers by artificially keeping retail prices high.

Private enforcement: on the rise

The IAA’s decision shows that procedural cooperation can materially reduce exposure to fines, especially when leniency, settlement and timely compliance enhancements are combined. 

However, without detracting from the above, the obligation to acknowledge liability under the settlement route means that settling parties effectively waive their right to appeal and renders the IAA's decision final in practice. 

Given the decision’s detailed account of how the cartel operated and the context of a significant rise in private enforcement, GDO operators are very likely to promptly consider follow-on damages actions. Indeed, the tension between securing a settlement/leniency reduction and the risk of paving the way for follow-on damages claims forms part of the broader debate around the decline in leniency applications. 

The takeaway for market participants is therefore that they should assess the possible outcome of antitrust damages claims and the effectiveness of potential defenses—in this case pass-on, given the nature of the products and the role of GDO operators in reselling them to end consumers.