Introduction

The European Union’s sanctions regime on Russia (in particular Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Regulation (EU) 269/2014) has evolved rapidly over the past decade in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. With 17 sanctions packages already in force and an 18th on the horizon, the regulatory landscape has become increasingly complex. Recent years have seen a marked uptick in enforcement activity, with national authorities across the EU stepping up investigations and prosecutions for sanctions violations. For companies doing business with an EU nexus, this means heightened legal exposure and a pressing need to ensure robust compliance. This alert provides an overview of the challenges posed by divergent national approaches, the latest enforcement trends, and the impact of the new harmonisation directive.

Key take-aways

Recent cases across Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Spain illustrate a clear shift toward criminal prosecution, asset confiscation and multi-million-euro corporate fines. Divergent national interpretations continue to create uncertainty, but the new Harmonisation Directive (EU) 2024/1226 (Directive 2024/1226)¹  – requiring Member States to criminalise sanctions breaches and introduce turnover-based fines – will progressively align enforcement thresholds and raise penalty ceilings throughout the bloc. Although some jurisdictions have fully transposed the Directive, several (including Germany, France, Belgium and Spain) are racing to implement the requisite legislative changes, signalling that enforcement will harden once these reforms take effect.

Businesses should therefore (i) treat sanctions compliance as a board-level risk-management priority, (ii) reinforce due-diligence, screening and escalation protocols, and (iii) prepare for coordinated multi-jurisdictional investigations. Failure to act now will expose both corporates and individuals to escalating fines, asset freezes and potential prison sentences as EU authorities continue to scale up their enforcement efforts.

How are EU member states enforcing EU sanctions differently?

While EU sanctions are directly applicable across all Member States, their enforcement is left to national authorities. This has resulted in a patchwork of approaches:

• Resource disparities: Some Member States have dedicated significant resources to enforcement, while others face constraints or competing priorities, leading to uneven levels of scrutiny and prosecution.
• Divergent interpretations: Despite non-binding EU guidelines² , Member States may interpret and apply sanctions differently, creating legal uncertainty for economic operators across borders.

In recent months, various Member States have initiated criminal proceedings for violations of EU sanctions. Some of these proceedings have already been concluded by court rulings, in some cases with severe penalties for the perpetrators:

• In Germany, the Hamburg Regional Court has decided to initiate criminal proceedings against two former Siemens executives. The defendants are accused of violating EU sanctions by supporting the export of Siemens gas turbines worth EUR 111 million to Russian-occupied Crimea.
• Also in Germany, a person was sentenced to seven years in prison. As managing director, this individual was responsible for the delivery of six machine tools, classified as dual-use items, to a Russian arms manufacturer in 2015. The court ordered the confiscation of EUR 3 million from the company and EUR 2,1 million from the person himself.³
• In the Netherlands, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD, Fiscale inlichtingen-en opsporingsdienst) has increased the time spent on sanctions enforcement, with a special focus on the Port of Rotterdam as a logistical hub for the rest of Europe.⁴  In addition, the  Dutch Public Prosecution Office (DPPO, Openbaar Ministerie) has stated that enforcement of sanctions violations is a priority, and the first cases concerning more recent breaches have already emerged.⁵  Additional high-profile investigations are expected in the upcoming months and years, such as the probe into Damen Shipyards for alleged illegal exports to Russia.₆
• In France, although there has been little criminal pursuit of sanctions violations in recent years (i.e., investigations have been conducted and are still ongoing, but we are not aware of any actual criminal convictions on these grounds), the National Financial Prosecution Office (PNF, Parquet national financier) has recently expressed its desire to be granted jurisdiction over international sanctions violations, which could revolutionise the French enforcement landscape in this field and significantly boost related criminal activities.⁷  Likewise, the French European Prosecutor indicated last month before a French Senate that he supports extending the jurisdiction of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to violations of EU sanctions in order to make them a matter of public priority.⁸ 
• Similarly, in Belgium, EU sanctions enforcement has been limited. To date, only a small number of alleged breaches of the EU sanctions regimes relating to Syria and Iran have been prosecuted before the Belgian courts. As several years typically elapse between the identification of a potential violation and enforcement before the courts, we expect that new cases arising from the EU sanctions imposed against Russia are in the pipeline, including such against corporates and financial intermediaries on the back of Belgium’s comprehensive corporate criminal liability regime. On the regulatory front, in 2022, the Belgian legislator introduced an exception to the secrecy obligation of the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI), allowing it to share information with the Treasury of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, the authority responsible for sanctions enforcement. In 2023, this change led to four notifications from the CTIF-CFI to the Treasury, which we expect will drive increased enforcement going forward.
• In Spain, enforcement has shifted decisively from an almost exclusive reliance on administrative fines under smuggling and anti-money laundering regulations, to full-scale criminal investigations led by the National Court (Audiencia Nacional), the Attorney General’s Office and specialised units of the Spanish Police and Customs Surveillance. 2024–2025 has already produced several high-profile matters. In February 2025 the authorities uncovered illegal exports of chemical products to Russia, including substances classified as precursors to chemical weapons, nerve agents, and explosives, for which five individuals were arrested, accused of violation of EU regulations on dual-use goods and EU sanctions. This was Phase 2 of an investigation concluded in October 2024 that uncovered a Spanish company managed by Russian nationals that had established a sophisticated logistical and economic scheme to export internationally sanctioned products to Russia. Overall, there has been a significant increase in coordinated raids in Spain since mid-2024, confirming that criminal prosecution of sanctions violations is becoming the norm.

Against this backdrop – and in light of the EU’s broader push to criminalise sanctions infringements – we expect authorities in Member States to open more investigations and seek higher penalties in the months and years ahead.

New harmonisation directive and implementation status in a number of EU countries

Until recently, the lack of EU-wide minimum standards for prosecuting sanctions violations has contributed to fragmented enforcement. The adoption of Directive 2024/1226, which sets out common definitions of criminal offences and penalties for breaches of EU sanctions law, is intended to change this. Member States were obliged to transpose Directive 2024/1226 into national law byMay 20, 2025. Some Member States had no need to adopt further (criminal) provisions. Other Member States failed to transpose Directive 2024/1226 on time:

• In the Netherlands, sanctions breaches have long qualified as criminal offences pursuant to the Dutch Sanctions Act (Sanctiewet 1977) and are prosecuted under the Economic Offences Act (Wet op de economische delicten, WED). Consequently, the EU’s new Directive 2024/1226 does not require any amendments to Dutch legislation. Confirming this view, the Minister of Justice and Security stated on 15 April 2025 – ahead of the 20 May 2025 transposition deadline – that no additional legislative measures are required for the Netherlands to comply with the Directive.⁹
• Germany already has a comprehensive regime for prosecuting violations of EU sanctions law. However, some provisions need to be tightened in order to fully implement Directive 2024/1226. In autumn 2024, the German government in office at the time introduced a draft law¹⁰ to the German parliament that was intended to transpose Directive 2024/1226 into national law. However, due to the collapse of the German government in November 2024, the draft law was not passed. The new federal government will have to make the implementation of Directive 2024/1226 a priority and start a new legislative process soon.
• France has only just started to transpose Directive 2024/1226, starting with a decree on 28 May 2025 designating the body in France (namely the French Advisory Council on the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) responsible for ensuring coordination and cooperation between law enforcement authorities and authorities in charge of implementing Union restrictive measures, in relation to the criminal activities covered by the Directive. Although violations of sanctions are already criminally punishable under French law, the Directive aims at imposing certain concepts and tools, such as serious negligence and maximum levels of fines based on total worldwide turnover, that are not currently reflected in the French legal framework and may therefore require further legislative adjustments. In line with most French legal scholars, we therefore expect to see additional transposition measures soon, likely in Q4 2025 or early 2026.
• In Belgium, breaches of EU sanctions are already punishable as a criminal offence and may result in criminal fines of up to EUR 960,000 for legal entities. Since 2019, the Treasury of the Belgian Ministry of Finance also has the power to impose administrative fines, reaching up to EUR 2.5 million. The Belgian sanctions enforcement framework currently does not permit the imposition of criminal fines calculated as a percentage of a legal entity’s total worldwide turnover. Such a turnover-based fine exists for other criminal offences, and we expect that the Belgian sanctions enforcement regime will need to be adapted in line with Directive 2024/1226 on this point. Given that the Belgian sanctions enforcement regime is currently somewhat fragmented, the introduction of Directive 2024/1226 also presents an opportunity to address and harmonize the existing inconsistencies in Belgium’s approach.
• Spain has not yet completed the transposition of Directive 2024/1226. On 25 March 2025, the Spanish government approved a draft law¹¹ that would (i) amend the Criminal Code expressly criminalising violations of EU restrictive measures, (ii) introduce corporate liability for the referred offences, and (iii) tighten money laundering provisions to increase penalties if the assets originate from violations of EU restrictive measures. The draft law would also provide for the establishment of a joint coordination commission to ensure cooperation among judicial, police and administrative authorities to monitor the enforcement of EU sanctions. Although the government has indicated its intention to secure parliamentary approval by the end of 2025, the deadline for transposing Directive 2024/1226 has already lapsed, and prosecutors continue to rely on existing smuggling and anti-money laundering provisions until formal transposition.

Are you prepared for increased enforcement and stricter penalties?

Recent court decisions demonstrate that violations of EU sanctions can result in severe penalties, including significant fines, asset confiscation, and lengthy prison sentences for individuals. The trend towards more aggressive enforcement is clear, and the risk of non-compliance is higher than ever. In addition, the EU is expected to intensify its focus on third countries that directly or indirectly support Russia through economic cooperation with the 18th EU sanctions package.¹²

With enforcement on the rise and the legal framework tightening, for compliance departments of European companies or non-EU companies doing business within the EU the following should be key:

• Prioritise sanctions compliance as a core element of your risk management strategy.
• Conduct thorough due diligence on business partners and transactions.
• Keep in mind that business partners from other countries, like China, might be subject to EU sanctions, and that circumventing sanctions is prohibited.
• Review and update internal policies and training to reflect the latest legal requirements.
• Stay abreast of evolving EU and national sanctions enforcement trends.
• Seek expert guidance on complex issues, and ensure your teams are equipped to navigate the fast-changing sanctions landscape.

The EU’s commitment to robust sanctions enforcement is reshaping the compliance environment for businesses. As authorities intensify their efforts and harmonisation measures take effect, the cost of non-compliance will only increase. It is time to review your practices, reinforce your controls, and ensure you are ready for the new era of EU sanctions enforcement.

Footnotes

_{1. Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673 (here).}

_{2. Which include the EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures (here) and the various FAQ documents maintained by the European Commission (here).}

_{3. Stuttgart Higher Regional Court, judgment of 7 November 2024 – 2 St 3 BJs 48/22. The judgment is not yet final.}

_{4. See FIOD Annual Report 2024 (here).}

_{5. See for example District Court Rotterdam, judgment dated 3 October 2024 – ECLI:NL:RBROT:2024:9672. The Court imposed a EUR 165.826 fine for the export of restricted goods to Russia and the circumvention of Reg 833. Individuals can similarly expect serious penalties. The Hague District Court imposed a prison sentence of 18 months for sanctions violations and forgery, judgment dated 20 May 2025 – ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2025:945.}

_{6. For example the case against Damen Shipyards Gorinchem for illegal exports to Russia in the second half of 2022, which the DPPO announced on 25 April 2025 (here).}

_{7. See for example the PNF’s 2024 activity report (here).}

_{8. As can be seen from the minutes available on the French Senate’s website (here) and highlighted in the press (here).} 

_{9. Mededeling van de Minister van Justitie en Veiligheid van 15 april 2025 (Stcrt. 2025, 12900 (here)).}

_{10. Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und anderer Rechtsvorschriften (here).}

_{11. Anteproyecto de ley orgánica de modificación de la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal para la transposición de la Directiva (UE) 2024/1226 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 24 de abril de 2024, relativa a la definición de los delitos y las sanciones por la vulneración de las medidas restrictivas de la Unión, y por la que se modifica la Directiva (UE) 2018/1673 (here).}

_{12. Statement by President von der Leyen on 10th June 2025 (here)}