What stands out about the SEC’s rulemaking is not any single proposal, but the breadth of the expected change and the fact that it is all coming at once. The SEC’s public company agenda includes rulemakings focused on an overhaul of the disclosure framework, a resetting of the IPO and registered offering process and a meaningful shift in the role the SEC plays in the relationship between companies and their shareholders and, in many cases, the Commission is not just adjusting the existing framework, as it has in the past, but replacing it or even eliminating it.
At the same time as these changes are being pursued, we are entering the final two years of the current presidential administration, and the lessons we have learned from the last several presidential transitions suggest that the durability of these reforms is far from assured.
While public companies have broadly welcomed Chair Atkins’ deregulatory agenda, the reality is more complicated. A shift to principles-based disclosure and the changes implemented and proposed to the relationship between public companies and their shareholders each illustrates that deregulation may not always result in relief from the burdens of being a public company.
The Atkins agenda: objectives for public companies
Chair Atkins’ stated objectives for public company regulation are to make the IPO a real capital raising tool for companies of all sizes and industries, rather than something that is reserved for the largest private companies or serves as a liquidity event for insiders, and to ease the burdens companies face once they are public.3 Chair Atkins has noted that there are approximately 4,700 exchange-listed companies today, compared to roughly 7,800 in 1997. Chair Atkins has made reversing that trend one of the organizing principles of his tenure.4
He has described this effort as focused on the following three pillars:5
- Focus disclosure requirements on materiality. Modernizing, rationalizing and streamlining SEC disclosure requirements so that disclosures are focused and meaningful to investors, with materiality as the only standard. For Chair Atkins, this means financial and decision-useful materiality for investors,
- Removing the SEC from the relationship between companies and their shareholders. Revisiting the SEC rules to ensure that it is not using its authority to establish governance standards, leaving these matters to state governments, and
- Reforming securities litigation. Using the SEC’s tools to reform the securities litigation landscape to “shield the innovator from the frivolous—and protect the investor from the fraudulent.”
Disclosure reform6
The Division of Corporation Finance is pursuing what appears to be a line-by-line review of Regulation S-K, the SEC’s non-financial reporting framework, to eliminate immaterial and prescriptive requirements. At the same time, it is advancing a separate initiative to streamline executive compensation disclosures.7
Executive compensation reporting has expanded steadily since 2006, with pay ratio and pay-versus-performance mandates under Dodd-Frank and a patchwork of regulations layered on top of an already lengthy analysis of compensation philosophy.
This accumulation of rules made executive compensation disclosures an obvious focus for a Commission committed to reducing compliance costs and prioritizing materiality. The rule proposal, issued in November 2026, will drastically reform an executive compensation framework that has largely been in place since 2006.8
In May 2026, the Commission proposed to permit companies to file a single semiannual report in lieu of three quarterly reports, an idea President Trump floated in his first term and returned to in his second. Chair Atkins has championed this change.
Quarterly reporting has been a fixture of U.S. markets for more than half a century and an optional approach would allow companies to calibrate their reporting cadence to practices in their industry and demands of their investor base.9
One of the more consequential changes is the proposed simplification of filer status categories.10 The current five overlapping categories of public company status that determine access to scaled reporting obligations would collapse into two, effectively creating a category of bigger companies and another category for all other companies.
The proposal would raise the threshold to be subject to full disclosure requirements from USD700 million to USD2 billion along with a minimum five-year post-IPO on-ramp for all newly public companies.
The SEC estimates that approximately 81% of all reporting companies would fall below the proposed USD2bn threshold, benefiting from new scaled disclosure requirements and related accommodations, including relief from the auditor attestation requirement for internal control over financial reporting under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, say-on-pay votes and detailed disclosures on compensation philosophy. This would represent a significant reduction of the companies covered by the most rigorous disclosure requirements.
Offering reform
The registered offering reform proposal may be the most consequential change to the offering process since the 2005 offering reforms that brought us the well-known seasoned issuer (WKSI) category and transformed shelf registration.11 The proposal would eliminate the public float threshold and the one-year seasoning requirement to conduct a shelf offering.
It would also extend shelf registration to substantially all reporting companies, including companies that have just completed an initial public offering. The WKSI structure would be replaced by a tiered framework under which virtually all exchange-listed companies would gain many of the key benefits that have been only available to the largest companies, including automatic shelf registration, “pay as you go” registration fees and broad offering-related communications flexibility.
The SEC estimates that the proposal would increase the number of companies eligible to use shelf registration by more than 60% and the number eligible for WKSI-equivalent benefits would increase by more than 200%. The speed and efficiency of raising capital through shelf registration would likely become the standard. More companies would benefit from the flexibility and streamlined access to capital through tools like at-the-market offerings, which previously have been unavailable to them.
Shareholder relationships
The changes implemented and proposed to the SEC’s role in the relationship between companies and their shareholders are also significant. In November 2025, in advance of the 2025–2026 proxy season, the Division of Corporation Finance announced that it would not respond to requests seeking a review of a company’s decision to exclude a shareholder proposal submitted under Rule 14a-8 and, in August 2026, it discontinued responding to Rule 14a-8 review requests entirely.
More importantly, in September 2026, the Commission proposed to rescind Rule 14a-8 entirely, which would eliminate the right under federal law for a shareholder of a U.S. public company to include a shareholder proposal in a company’s proxy statement.
The Commission’s rationale for this proposal was principally that the rule exceeds the SEC’s authority under Section 14(a). So, after more than 80 years, the SEC would step out of its role as “referee” for shareholder proposals and leave those questions to state law, company governing documents and, importantly, companies and their shareholders to sort out themselves.12
The SEC’s approach to beneficial ownership reporting has also resulted in a meaningful shift in practices. Staff guidance issued in February 2025 took a more demanding view of when engagement by otherwise passive investors—for example, pressing for specific governance or policy changes while conditioning support for director nominees on those changes—may cause the loss of Schedule 13G passive investor eligibility.
Subsequent SEC staff guidance has clarified the types of communications that remain permissible, but the overall effect has been to reset how large investors engage with management. This new stance culminated in the Commission’s October 2026 Section 21(a) report, which formally cautioned that coordinated engagement through investor organizations or groups can result in the formation of a “group” and can cause investors to lose eligibility to report on Schedule 13G as a passive investor.13
Litigation reform
The Commission has yet to propose meaningful litigation reform. Chair Atkins has said that frivolous securities class actions can drive away capital from U.S. public markets and every public company ends up paying for them through higher directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums, whether or not the company is ever sued.
Chair Atkins likely recognizes that comprehensive litigation reform would require action from Congress and cannot be achieved through SEC rulemaking alone, so his strategy has been focused on giving companies options and encouraging the states to compete by providing more attractive corporate statutes.
Chair Atkins’ most significant step to address the litigation reform pillar of his agenda came in September 2025, when the Commission issued a policy statement concluding that mandatory arbitration provisions for federal securities claims are not inconsistent with the federal securities laws and will not affect the SEC’s decision to declare a registration statement effective.
The policy statement reversed a long-standing Division of Corporation Finance practice of not allowing a company that included such a provision in its organizational documents to go public. Chair Atkins has presented the decision as one for the company, not the Commission.
Significant questions remain, however, including the effect of Delaware’s 2025 amendments to its General Corporation Law, which require forum selection provisions to preserve access to at least one Delaware court (and may be read to prohibit mandatory arbitration) and extend the prohibition on fee shifting to federal securities claims; whether any such state prohibition is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act; potential fiduciary duty challenges; and the reaction of institutional investors, proxy advisors and directors’ and officers’ insurers—not to mention whether companies actually want to give up the established and understood class action process, including the ability to dispose of claims on a motion to dismiss and to resolve claims in a single proceeding in favor of arbitrating what could be hundreds of individual claims.14
Chair Atkins has openly criticized Delaware’s approach, calling the arbitration and fee-shifting prohibitions “two giant steps backward,” has noted Texas’s recent corporate law changes and has urged the Delaware legislature to revisit both prohibitions.15
Chair Atkins has also commented on the relationship between disclosure and liability. In his February 2026 remarks, he observed that risk factors, which he said were once envisioned as a two- to three-page discussion of what keeps management up at night, have become one of the longest sections of an annual report, a disclosure “written by lawyers for lawyers.”
He floated the idea of a safe harbor providing that the failure to disclose the impact of publicized events reasonably likely to affect most companies would not be a material omission, which would reduce the incentive to catalog every conceivable contingency.
It is uncertain whether companies (and their lawyers) will be willing to cut back or eliminate lengthy risk factor disclosures, which are often regarded as “cheap insurance” against risks that may never happen.16
Chair Atkins has combined these initiatives with changes to the SEC’s own enforcement processes, including the Wells process, which is the formal mechanism that gives investigation targets advance notice of potential charges and an opportunity to submit a defense before an action is filed. Together with updated settlement practices, these changes emphasize transparency and consistency and move away from measuring success by the volume of enforcement actions.
Commenters broadly view these steps as a meaningful pro-company change. Some have questioned whether liability safe harbors could weaken oversight through private actions, and others have noted the difficult and arbitrary line that companies will need to draw between generic, industry-wide risks and company-specific threats. Endorsing mandatory arbitration and supporting state alternatives to Delaware is also likely to intensify competition among states for corporate charters.17
And there is more to come
The agenda signals that further proposals are coming. Among other things, the Commission is expected to propose reforms to the IPO process itself, addressing the registration, review and marketing mechanics that make going public slow and costly and that seem frozen in the technology and modes of communication of decades ago, and building on the expanded on-ramp in the filer status rule proposal.
The Commission is also expected to propose a rethinking of the private offering framework and, if its approach to other regulatory initiatives is any indication, we could see a complete revamp of the exempt offering pathways.
In the past, Congress has mandated exemptions that have resulted in Regulation Crowdfunding and an expanded Regulation A, but those have not fully delivered on their promise of improving innovators’ access to capital or creating a more direct route to an initial public offering. The proposal could go as far as a complete deregulation of offers, eliminating the ban on general solicitation and advertising, something the Commission has discussed for decades.
Deregulation is not always relief
While public companies and their advisors have broadly supported the Commission’s deregulatory direction, and much of it will reduce cost and burden, a closer look shows that the analysis is more complicated. In several areas, eliminating a rule or issuing new guidance does not remove the underlying issue; instead, it relocates the judgment, the cost and/or the risk to the company.
Regulation S-K reform is likely to replace many prescriptive line-item requirements with more principles-based requirements anchored in materiality, and we see this playing out in the scope of the rule proposal reforming executive compensation disclosures. A change like this appears to favor companies, which will have greater latitude to decide what to disclose and what to omit, but it also places that obligation squarely on the company, without the ability to point to a specific rule or line item as the reason a matter was, or was not, disclosed.
Materiality determinations are among the most difficult questions in disclosure practice, and they are judged with hindsight by plaintiffs and the market. Placing more of these judgments on legal and financial reporting teams will be new for many companies, and will call for stronger disclosure controls, more documentation of materiality analyses and closer coordination with auditors and disclosure committees.
The filer status proposal illustrates a similar trade-off. Eliminating the compensation philosophy included in a proxy statement’s Compensation Discussion and Analysis and the say-on-pay vote for non accelerated filers would certainly relieve compliance burdens for eligible companies, but it would also remove a forum for companies to explain their compensation philosophy and a “safer” outlet for investors to register dissatisfaction with pay, potentially shifting that dissatisfaction to votes against directors.
Many viewed the Division of Corporation Finance staff’s February 2025 guidance relating to Schedule 13G passive investor eligibility as a check on what they perceived to be aggressive tactics by shareholders pressing environmental and social initiatives while claiming passive investor status.
The reaction to the guidance, however, produced unintended consequences. Concerned about jeopardizing their Schedule 13G eligibility, many institutional investors curtailed the free flow of views in engagement meetings, leaving companies with less transparency into how their largest shareholders think and vote.
As a result, those responsible for investor engagement within public companies needed to be more proactive in soliciting feedback and anticipating what is on an investor’s mind. Companies and investors have since found a more workable balance in the information and perspectives they share, aided by staff guidance in September 2026, but the October 2026 Section 21(a) report has unsettled that balance again.
As the Commission explained in the proposing release to rescind Rule 14a-8, many of the justifications for the rule have not been substantiated in practice and the rule has had unintended consequences.
Chair Atkins has observed that precatory environmental and social proposals frequently involve issues not material to the company’s business, receive lower support than other proposals and consume significant management time and cost. Some proponents even use the process to promote their own interests and ideas without concern for whether a proposal attracts meaningful support.
Yet the shareholder proposal is a relatively inexpensive and efficient way for shareholders and advocacy groups to express views on what a company was or was not doing—a point Commissioner Peirce flagged for comment.18
The no-action process, although not binding on anyone, had evolved into a de facto adjudication process. Few liked it, but everyone accepted the outcome; everyone complained about the referee, but all sides respected the call.
Without Rule 14a-8 and the no-action process, views held by advocacy groups do not simply disappear. Shareholders and advocacy groups may instead turn to more aggressive tools, such as nominating directors or proposing business under advance notice bylaws, “vote no” campaigns against directors and, where available, proxy access. Each of these is likely to cost companies more, and to be far more disruptive, than a no-action request, engagement with the proponent and an opposition statement.
None of this suggests that the reforms are misguided. It does suggest that companies should evaluate each change not only for the burden it removes, but for the judgment, risk and investor behavior it may introduce in its place.
What will happen with all of these changes?
Some of these rules are likely to be challenged with the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 being a leading candidate. Investor advocates petitioned the SEC to preserve the rule before the proposal was issued,19 and a challenge could argue that Section 14(a) does in fact authorize Rule 14a-8, a view that the SEC itself has seemed to hold for decades, and that the Commission’s alternative policy rationale is vulnerable under traditional Administrative Procedure Act standards.
A prolonged challenge could delay implementation and extend uncertainty well beyond the 2027 proxy season. The semiannual reporting proposal is another possible candidate. It has drawn substantial opposition and received more than 250,000 comment letters opposing the proposal.
While the vast majority were form letters, we have not seen this volume of comment on a rulemaking since the SEC’s climate disclosure rule, which the Commission stopped defending in the Eighth Circuit in March 2025 and proposed to rescind in its entirety on May 29, 2026.20
The more fundamental question is durability. If a different party wins the presidency in 2028, SEC leadership will change and, with it, the Commission’s philosophy, perspective and priorities that have animated these rulemakings. Proposals that have not been adopted may simply not proceed. More significantly, a new Commission could act to rescind adopted rules or, possibly, decline to defend adopted rules that have been challenged in court.
Recent history shows that these are not hypothetical risks. After the 2020 election, the SEC under Chair Gary Gensler moved to unwind work done under his predecessor, Chair Jay Clayton, rescinding key elements of the 2020 proxy voting advice rules in 2022. After the 2024 election, the pattern reversed.
Chair Gensler’s July 2022 proposing release to amend Rule 14a-8 that would have narrowed the substantial implementation, duplication and resubmission exclusions, making it harder for companies to exclude proposals, was never adopted following the election of President Trump and leadership change at the SEC. The Commission formally withdrew it in 2025.
Under Acting Chair Mark Uyeda, the Commission voted in March 2025 to end its defense of the 2024 climate disclosure rules in the Eighth Circuit and, in May 2026, the Commission proposed to rescind them formally.
In June 2025, the new Commission under Chair Atkins withdrew a series of Chair Gensler-era proposals, noting that it would publish new proposals if it chose to pursue any of those matters.21 The decision not to defend a rule is a particularly potent tool, because it can effectively end a rule’s life without the time and process required for a new rulemaking.
This regulatory “see saw” can be even more immediate where change comes through SEC staff guidance or interpretive positions, which are not subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and can be altered quickly.
Shareholder proposals offer the clearest example. Staff Legal Bulletins (SLB) 14I, 14J and 14K, issued between 2017 and 2019, which served as an updated road map to navigate Rule 14a-8, gave companies more room to exclude proposals; SLB 14L, issued in November 2021, rescinded all three and made exclusion harder; and SLB 14M, issued in February 2025 in the middle of proxy season, rescinded SLB 14L and reinstated much of the earlier guidance.
The positions flipped back and forth across three elections, and the SEC staff have now stopped responding to no-action requests altogether while the Commission proposes to rescind the rule. The Schedule 13G guidance, issued and applied within a matter of days, is a similar example.
The Commission’s current agenda in the public company area is robust and, by historical standards, remarkably ambitious. Companies, investors and their advisors should engage in the comment process and prepare for meaningful change.
They should also plan for a period of real uncertainty. Rules adopted over the next two years, policy statements (such as the one on mandatory arbitration), and SEC staff interpretations may be challenged in court, left undefended or quickly rescinded by a future Commission, and guidance can change even faster. Whether these reforms prove durable beyond the next election is, for now, an open question.
Footnotes
1. Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance’s 25th Anniversary Gala (Oct. 9, 2025).
2. SEC, Agency Rule List – Spring 2026, Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. See, also Regulatory Flexibility Agenda, Release No. 33-11379, 90 Fed. Reg. 45,652 (Sept. 22, 2025) (prior agenda).
3. Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Remarks at the Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee Meeting (Apr. 28, 2026).
4. Paul S. Atkins, supra note 1 (citing data from the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis).
5. Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Remarks at the Texas Stock Exchange Event: Welcome to the Boom Belt: A Return to First Principles in Public Markets (Apr. 7, 2026).
6. Not all reform efforts have reduced disclosure requirements. Congress, under the Holding Foreign Insiders Accountable Act enacted in December 2025, required directors and officers of foreign private issuers to file beneficial ownership reports. This change is part of a broader reexamination of the accommodations available to foreign private issuers that began with its concept release on foreign private issuer eligibility. This review could result in a meaningful change to the overall approach to foreign private issuers that has existed for decades. For more information, See, A&O Shearman, What a relief: SEC exempts directors and officers of qualifying foreign private issuers from Section 16(a) reporting requirements (Mar. 10, 2026). See, also Holding Foreign Insiders Accountable Act Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 104903, 91 Fed. Reg. 10,320 (Mar. 3, 2026).
7. See, Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Statement on Reforming Regulation S-K (Jan. 13, 2026; Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Statement on the Upcoming Executive Compensation Roundtable (May 16, 2025).
8. See, Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform, Release Number 33-11455, 34-106873, IC-36385 (November 13, 2026).
9. See, Semiannual Reporting, Release No. 33-11414, 91 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (May 7, 2026); Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Statement on Proposing Release for Semiannual Reporting (May 5, 2026).
10. See, Enhancement of Emerging Growth Company Accommodations and Simplification of Filer Status for Reporting Companies, Release No. 33-11419, 91 Fed. Reg. 30,086 (May 21, 2026); A&O Shearman, SEC Proposes Sweeping Reforms to Public Company Filer Status Framework and Emerging Growth Companies Accommodations (May 27, 2026).
11. See, Securities Offering Reform, Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005); Registered Offering Reform, Release No. 33-11418, 91 Fed. Reg. 31,022 (May 26, 2026); A&O Shearman, SEC Proposes Registered Offering Reform (May 27, 2026).
12. Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Statement Regarding the Division of Corporation Finance’s Role in the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy Season (Nov. 17, 2025); Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Updated Statement Regarding the Division of Corporation Finance’s Role in the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Process (Aug. 14, 2026); Rescission of Rule 14a-8’s Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4, Exchange Act Release No. 106383, 91 Fed. Reg. 59,904 (Sept. 21, 2026). For more information, See, Richard Alsop and Jeff Hoschander, Filling the void – implications of Rule 14a-8 rescission for companies and shareholders, in Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Survey 2026.
13. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Climate Action 100+ and the Election of Directors at the May 2021 Annual Meeting of ExxonMobil Corporation, Release No. 34-106611 (Oct. 7, 2026); SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, Questions 103.11 and 103.12 (Feb. 11, 2025); Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting, Release No. 34 98704, 88 Fed. Reg. 76,896 (Nov. 7, 2023). For more information, See, Alsop and Hyder, supra note 12.
14. See, Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, Release No. 33-11389, 90 Fed. Reg. 45,125 (Sept. 19, 2025); S.B. 95, 153d Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2025) (amending Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) & 115(c)); A&O Shearman, SEC Will No Longer Object to Provisions Requiring Investors to Arbitrate Securities Law Claims (Sept. 24, 2025).
15. Paul S. Atkins, Chair, SEC, Remarks at the Texas A&M School of Law Corporate Law Symposium (Feb. 17, 2026).
16. We have suggested an alternative that avoids the risk of discouraging companies from discussing public events at all: amending Rule 10b-5, and potentially Items 105 and 303 of Regulation S-K, to state expressly that forward looking risk factor disclosure is not actionable as a misrepresentation. This approach would codify the reasoning of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and resolve a split with the Ninth Circuit, which has held that a hypothetical forward looking risk factor can be misleading where the company failed to disclose that the risk had already materialized. See, Adam Hakki, Lona Nallengara & Joshua Ebersole, One Idea To Fix The SEC’s Risk Factor Disclosure Rules, Law360 (Mar. 24, 2026). Compare Kolominsky v. Root Inc., 100 F.4th 675 (6th Cir. 2024), and In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., 31 F.4th 898, 901 (4th Cir. 2022), with In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 87 F.4th 934 (9th Cir. 2023).
17. See, Mallory Tosch Hoggatt, Daniel Litowitz, Billy Marsh, Sean Skiffington, Samantha Peppers and Justin Meshulam, Beyond DExit: recent developments in state corporate law, business courts and jurisdictional competition, in Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Survey 2026.
18. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC, A Proposal on Proposals (Sept. 16, 2026).
19. Letter from Sanford Lewis, Dir., Shareholder Rights Grp., et al., to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, SEC, Rulemaking Petition to Retain Rule 14a-8, Specifically the No-Action Process and the Underlying Exclusion and Procedural Rules (July 23, 2026) (File No. 4-917).
20. Rescission of Climate-Related Disclosure Rules, Release No. 33-11421, 91 Fed. Reg. 33,296 (June 3, 2026).
21. Withdrawal of Proposed Regulatory Actions, Release No. 33-11377, 90 Fed. Reg. 25,531 (June 17, 2025).