Their seat at the proverbial table is now under attack from multiple directions: a presidential executive order and federal regulatory investigations; state legislation and multi-state enforcement actions; a Department of Labor (DOL) technical release creating new ERISA fiduciary obligations; and technology-driven market disruption threatening the industry’s foundational business model.
The proxy advisory firms, however, are fighting back, securing victories in the courtroom against restrictive state statutes and obtaining a D.C. Circuit ruling that proxy voting advice is not a “solicitation” subject to SEC regulation. But amid the turmoil, companies and shareholders are left to wonder: when the dust settles, will proxy advisors remain influential, or will proxy advice become more regulated, fragmented and technology-driven?
Under attack
Regulatory pressure
The regulatory landscape for proxy advisory firms has undergone sweeping change. In November 2025, the FTC launched a formal antitrust investigation into ISS and Glass Lewis, focusing on their ESG-related recommendations and questioning whether the duopoly constitutes unfair competition.1
The following month, President Trump signed Executive Order 14366,2 which directed the SEC to review its regulatory regime as applied to proxy advisors’ recommendations and consider whether they should register under the Investment Advisers Act, as well as to assess whether their actions could serve as a vehicle for coordination such that they form a “group” under Section 13 of the Exchange Act.
In the same executive order, the DOL was instructed to examine the ERISA fiduciary duty implications of proxy advisors advancing non-financial or political agendas, rather than acting strictly in the financial interests of plan participants.3 The order also directed the FTC to investigate, in concert with the Department of Justice, potential federal antitrust violations or unfair methods of competition or deceptive practices.
This federal push followed a notable court decision affecting the SEC’s oversight authority. On July 1, 2025, the D.C. Circuit unanimously held in ISS v. SEC that proxy voting advice does not constitute a “solicitation” under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, affirming the District Court’s invalidation of the SEC’s regulatory framework for proxy advisors.4
Because Section 14(a) had been the SEC’s principal basis for asserting oversight authority over proxy advisors, the ruling eliminated the agency’s most direct tool and forced federal regulators to look elsewhere for oversight mechanisms—chiefly the Investment Advisers Act and ERISA, as described below.
Two additional 2026 developments illustrate this redirection, and both carry real consequences for ISS and Glass Lewis. In April 2026, the DOL issued a technical release clarifying that proxy advisory firms whose advice reaches ERISA-covered plans may be ERISA fiduciaries.5
Fiduciary status carries a materially higher standard of accountability than the proxy advisory firms have historically borne: it exposes proxy advisory firms to duties of prudence and loyalty running to ERISA plan participants, to prohibited transaction constraints, and to potential personal liability and private litigation risk if their recommendations are found to reflect non-pecuniary considerations.
Then, on August 5, 2026, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division withdrew the 1987 Business Review Letter it had issued to ISS in which it stated it had “no current intention” to challenge ISS under the antitrust laws.
In withdrawing the Letter, the Antitrust Division concluded that the Letter is not applicable to ISS’s current business practices and that its business model “is now in direct conflict with the language in the Letter.” It also pointed to the concentration of the proxy advisory market, with ISS and Glass Lewis together controlling more than 90% of the market, as a further “competition concern.”6
While the withdrawal is not a finding that ISS has violated antitrust laws, it did limit the antitrust comfort ISS historically relied on for decades and suggested that its core business model could face scrutiny, leaving it exposed to enforcement and private treble-damages claims.
State legislative action
State legislatures have mounted a parallel offensive. Texas led with Senate Bill 2337 (effective September 1, 2025),7 requiring proxy advisors to disclose their reliance on “nonfinancial factors” and to deliver adverse recommendations to the subject company at the same time they are provided to clients. Kansas (the Proxy Advisor Transparency Act, enacted April 2026) and Indiana (HB 1273, March 2026) followed.
All shared a common structure: disclosure obligations are triggered whenever a recommendation diverges from management’s position, particularly where the recommendation rests on ESG or diversity considerations, and Kentucky and Oklahoma enacted similar statutes later in 2026.
Enforcement has been equally aggressive. The Texas Attorney General investigated ISS in September 2025, under the state’s deceptive trade practices and fiduciary duty theories; Florida sued ISS in November 2025, alleging that undisclosed ESG-driven recommendations misled clients and breached duties owed to them; and four states filed coordinated lawsuits in May 2026 advancing similar consumer protection and fiduciary claims alongside alleged violations of the new disclosure statutes.8
Several state attorneys general and legislators have characterized the proxy advisory duopoly as a “proxy advisory cartel” whose market power distorts governance and imposes politically motivated agendas on American businesses.
Fighting back
The proxy advisors have not accepted these challenges passively. On July 24, 2025, both ISS and Glass Lewis filed lawsuits in the Western District of Texas challenging SB 2337 on multiple constitutional grounds.9
On August 29, 2025, a Western District court granted preliminary injunctions blocking enforcement against both firms, and the firms subsequently obtained injunctions against the Kansas and Indiana statutes in June 2026 and against the Oklahoma statute on October 31, 2026.10 ISS declared that the Texas ruling “safeguard core First Amendment principles.”11
The proxy advisory firms’ arguments rest on three constitutional theories. First, proxy voting recommendations are protected speech, so the government may not dictate their content. Second, the statutes compel speech and discriminate based on viewpoint, because the disclosure obligation is triggered only when an advisor recommends against management, while advice favorable to management carries no such burden. Third, the statutes burden interstate commerce, in violation of the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause, by regulating advice delivered nationwide.
Courts have found these theories persuasive enough to grant preliminary relief. The viewpoint discrimination challenge has drawn the most attention and signals the statutes may be vulnerable on constitutional grounds, which may prompt legislatures to redraft them on viewpoint-neutral terms.12
Importantly, these are interim victories, and the merits remain to be finally litigated. But for now, the proxy advisory firms have demonstrated that the constitutional barriers to regulating proxy advice may be higher than legislators initially anticipated.
The road ahead
The regulatory and legislative path
The trajectory is clear: proxy advisory firms that operated for decades with little direct regulation are now a target for regulators, enforcement officials and legislators seeking to curtail their influence over corporate governance matters. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in ISS v. SEC closed one avenue—the proxy solicitation framework under Section 14(a)—but it did not end that effort; rather, it redirected it.
The most viable federal path for regulation now runs through the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, where ISS is already registered and Glass Lewis is reportedly moving toward registration. Regulation under that statute would be meaningful: registered advisors owe fiduciary duties to their clients, must maintain compliance programs, policies on conflicts of interest, and books and records, and are subject to SEC examination and enforcement.
For firms whose recommendations are alleged to reflect non-pecuniary objectives, that framework supplies both a disclosure obligation and an enforcement mechanism. The DOL’s recent technical release adds a parallel layer of oversight through ERISA’s fiduciary framework.
Executive compensation disclosure reform and changes to filer status rules
A development that has attracted less attention in the governance community as to its implications for proxy advisors, but that could prove meaningful, is the SEC’s recent proposed rule amending the filer status framework.13
While this effort was not directed at proxy advisors, if adopted as proposed, the implications could be significant. Companies that have a public float of less than USD2 billion which are called Non-Accelerated Filers (NAFs), in the proposed rule, would be exempt from say-on-pay, say-on-frequency and say-on-golden-parachute votes—the shareholder votes where ISS and Glass Lewis exercise some of their greatest influence.
If the USD2bn cut-off is adopted, which we expect it will be, 81% of current public companies would be classified as NAFs, with all newly public companies retaining NAF status for at least five years post-IPO regardless of float size.14
This would dramatically shrink the universe of companies subject to mandatory compensation-related shareholder votes, and thus reduce the need for proxy advice on compensation voting recommendations. Proxy advisory firms may respond by recommending against the re-election of directors serving on the compensation committee, as an alternative lever for influencing pay practices.
Separately, in November 2026 the SEC proposed rules to revise the executive compensation disclosure requirements, which if adopted, will significantly reduce executive compensation-related disclosure.15 Taken together, these initiatives would substantially reduce the volume of compensation analysis and pay-related recommendations which proxy advisors produce each proxy season, and with it a core part of their influence, even if they redirect some of that influence towards compensation committee members.
Artificial intelligence: perhaps the greatest threat
For all the regulatory and legislative challenges described above, AI may pose the greatest threat to the proxy advisors’ business model, forcing the question of whether independent proxy advice remains necessary at all.
The premise underlying the dominance of ISS and Glass Lewis has always been one of practical necessity: institutional investors managing thousands of investments cannot independently research and formulate voting decisions for every ballot item. AI is rapidly eroding that assumption.
A dramatic signal came in January 2026, when JPMorgan Asset Management announced it was launching an internal AI-powered platform enabling JPMorgan to make voting decisions entirely in-house.16 Weeks later, Wells Fargo followed, launching its own internal proxy voting platform.17 These select examples of defections from the proxy advisory model signal that the largest asset managers may be seeing AI as providing a viable path to implementing their own voting analysis.
For their own part, the proxy advisors are also exploring AI. In April 2026, ISS announced its own AI research product that would provide automated research and voting recommendations allowing investors to customize their own voting policies.18
Glass Lewis had already begun its own pivot in October 2025, announcing it would retire its uniform benchmark policy by 2027 and shift to multiple voting perspectives with AI-enabled customization available by 2028.19 In April 2026, Glass Lewis released a white paper proposing a five-question evaluation framework for AI voting solutions and advocating a “human-centric AI” approach rather than simple “human-in-the-loop” oversight.20
These developments in AI-driven proxy advisory tools are also attracting interest from the broader fintech sector. Some fintech companies have announced AI-enabled voting tools that could bring independent analytical capability to mid-sized institutional investors that currently lack the resources to deviate from proxy advisor recommendations.21
In a world where each investor can generate customized, AI-driven voting analysis tailored to its own policies and priorities, the value proposition of a one-size-fits-all recommendation would likely diminish.
Our take
The proxy advisory industry stands at a crossroads. The regulatory and legislative forces described above are converging to reshape the role of proxy advisory firms, which may significantly affect the company-institutional investor ecosystem.
At the same time, AI is challenging the fundamental business model on which both ISS and Glass Lewis have operated for decades. While both firms have made recent meaningful adaptations to their ways of doing business, only time will tell whether these pivots will allow them to keep up with competitive market pressures.
For boards
The implications are immediate: prepare for a more fragmented, less predictable voting environment. Directors may see greater vote variability, increased pressure on director elections, and the need to track a broader range of investor-specific voting policies.
For institutional investors
The shift toward internalized stewardship is accelerating. Investors that follow this path will need robust AI governance frameworks to ensure their tools produce outcomes consistent with fiduciary obligations.
For retail investors
AI-driven platforms may democratize governance analysis, but the quality and objectivity of AI-generated voting guidance remain largely unregulated and untested.
For company management
The loss of a significant benchmark when proxy advisory policy changes take effect means companies can no longer craft governance practices to satisfy the proxy advisory firm frameworks. Management should also weigh what is lost in predictability before celebrating the waning influence of the proxy advisors. These firms publish their voting guidelines in advance of proxy season and apply their policies in a consistent and foreseeable way. Investor-specific, AI-generated voting policies may not offer similar transparency or predictability.
There is a final irony worth noting. Reducing the influence of ISS and Glass Lewis does not eliminate the demand for voting guidance—it fragments and disperses it. The result may be a governance landscape considerably more complicated for companies to navigate: one potentially characterized by more variable voting outcomes, and shareholders armed with AI-driven tools that enable engagement far more intrusive than a negative advisory recommendation ever was.
The battle in the courtroom is ongoing and the regulatory path uncertain, but it may be the quiet revolution in artificial intelligence—not any executive order, state statute, or judicial ruling—that is the ultimate governor.
Footnotes
1. See, Jack Pitcher & Dave Michaels, “Proxy Advisers ISS and Glass Lewis Are Facing Antitrust Probes,” Wall Street Journal (Nov. 12, 2025).
2. Exec. Order No. 14366, 90 Fed. Reg. 58503 (Dec. 16, 2025).
3. Id. at § 1.
4. ISS v. SEC, No. 24-5105 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2025), aff’g No. 1:19-cv-03275 (D.D.C. Feb. 2024).
5. DOL Technical Release 2026-01 (Apr. 2026).
6. The Antitrust Division stated that the Letter was expressly premised on ISS’s representation that it would “offer advice only on matters relating to the exercise of voting rights on issues of corporate governance” and would “not provide advice or engage in discussions with respect to the corporate operations or business activities” of the companies it covered. See, DOJ Press Release No. 26-886 (Aug. 5, 2026).
7. Tex. S.B. 2337 (eff. Sept. 1, 2025).
8. See, Texas v. ISS (Sept. 2025); Florida v. ISS (Nov. 2025); coordinated multi-state lawsuits (May 2026).
9. Glass Lewis v. Paxton No. 1:25-cv-00826 (W.D. Tex. filed July 24, 2025); ISS v. Paxton, No. 1:25-cv-01153 (W.D. Tex. filed July 24, 2025).
10. Preliminary Injunction Orders (Albright, J., Aug. 29, 2025); See, also injunction orders in Kansas (SB 375) and Indiana (HB 1273) (June 2026).
11. ISS Public Statement (Aug. 2025).
12. “Be Careful What You Wish For,” Board Agenda/Financial Times (July 10, 2026).
13. SEC Release No. 33-11419 (May 19, 2026). Release No. 33-11419, if adopted, would consolidate the existing five public company filer categories into just two: Large Accelerated Filers (LAFs), defined as companies with a public float of USD2bn or more and at least 60 months of reporting history, and Non-Accelerated Filers (NAFs), encompassing everyone else. See, A&O Shearman, “SEC proposes sweeping reforms to public company filer status framework and emerging growth companies accommodations” (May 27, 2026).
14. See, id.
15. See, Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform, Release Number 33-11455, 34-106873, IC-36385 (November 13, 2026).
16. “JPMorgan Asset Management Launches Proxy IQ,” Financial Times (Jan. 2026); “JPMAM Cuts Ties with Proxy Advisory Firms,” Pensions & Investments (Jan. 2026).
17. “Wells Fargo Launches Internal Proxy-Voting Platform Powered by Broadridge,” Pensions & Investments (Feb. 2026).
18. ISS STOXX Governance Press Release, “ISS Announces PolicySteward” (Apr. 2026).
19. Glass Lewis Press Release, “Glass Lewis Announces Multiple Voting Perspectives” (Oct. 2025).
20. Glass Lewis, “AI and the Fiduciary Test” (Apr. 2026).
21. See, Will Goodwin, “AI and the Future of Proxy Research: How New Tools Are Reshaping Stewardship Workflows”, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Mar. 3, 2026); “Pennant—The Corporate Governance OS for Public Markets”, Y Combinator (2026).