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Filling the void—implications of Rule 14a-8 rescission for companies and shareholders

Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey: Part 3

Filling the void—implications of Rule 14a-8 rescission for companies and shareholders
On September 16, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated rulemaking to rescind Rule 14a-8, the SEC rule that has governed the process for including shareholder proposals in company proxy statements for nearly 85 years. This represents the much-anticipated culmination of the current SEC’s project to eliminate the rule’s perceived burdens and reevaluate its validity that has been underway since even before Chair Atkins was appointed in 2025.

Proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8

The headline rationale for the SEC’s decision to propose a rescission of Rule 14a-8 is startling. The release states flatly that Rule 14a-8 exceeds the SEC’s statutory authority under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) by improperly intruding into state law corporate governance matters without express authorization by Congress. If that is true now, it presumably has been true for some or maybe all of the many decades since the predecessor rule’s adoption.

The question of whether Rule 14a-8 exceeds the SEC’s authority is a complex one and seems likely to be the subject of litigation if the rule is rescinded. The outcome of any such challenge will certainly depend on a court’s view of the breadth of latitude a federal agency enjoys when given a broad statutory mandate to protect investors in the proxy solicitation process. 

The Release, however, does not solely rely on the authority question as the basis for the proposal to rescind. Instead, it also catalogues a number of problems with Rule 14a-8 as it has come to operate today that it argues were not anticipated when the rule was originally adopted, including the increased cost of responding to Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals, the fact that shareholder proposals are not generally supported by management and mostly do not achieve a majority vote, and the increasing volume of proposals submitted annually.

In addition, the Release argues that Rule 14a-8 has unintended consequences that are inconsistent with the original purposes of the rule. Among other things, the Release asserts that the rule may serve as a mechanism for shareholder proponents to advance interests that in many cases may not be shared by the shareholders at large citing the relatively small number of proposals achieving a majority vote. 

It also asserts that the various bases for exclusion under the rule have drawn the SEC into making judgments about matters that are better addressed by state legislatures, courts and companies themselves. Based on these arguments, the Release proposes the complete rescission of Rule 14a-8, arguing there is no middle ground that would address these problems.

Naturally, this leads to the question: what next? If, as the Release suggests, Rule 14a-8 has inhibited the development of state law and private ordering in the area of shareholder proposals, how will shareholders and companies respond to its absence?

In this article we discuss the Rule 14a-8 environment in the unique 2026 proxy season including litigation developments and expectations for the coming proxy season, as well as how the future might play out for companies and shareholders assuming the SEC’s proposal to rescind the rule survives any challenge following adoption.

Background: proxy season 2026

The 2026 proxy season was fundamentally different from past seasons. It was deeply altered by the SEC’s decision in November 2025 not to issue substantive no-action letters in response to company requests to exclude proposals. The SEC stated that it would only provide “no objection” letters and only on the basis of a representation from the company or its representative that there was a basis for exclusion, which effectively operated like a rubber stamp.

As a result, companies and shareholders were forced to contend with a shareholder proposal season where all the usual bases for exclusion, and the related SEC staff guidance, continued to apply, but without the benefit of the SEC serving as an impartial adjudicator, either granting or withholding concurrence, which in the past was generally viewed by all parties involved as the final outcome with no expectation of litigation.

For companies, this new approach meant the freedom to make their own good faith determinations with respect to the applicability of the available exclusions, but that freedom came with a more pronounced risk of litigation in the event such good faith determinations were criticized or challenged.

For proponents, this required decisions about where to allocate scarce resources to ensure the greatest success in the absence of SEC decision making, and analysis of whether and when to challenge company determinations with litigation in the federal courts.

In the end, the season proceeded more or less normally, in that no extreme changes in behavior by proponents or companies were noted. There was no evidence that companies were overly aggressive in taking unprecedented liberties with exclusions, nor did proponents seem to have unusual successes with proposals being included without challenge because of company anxiety over litigation risk.

Companies almost universally adopted the approach of requesting no objection letters from the SEC and including detailed no-action letter style rationales for exclusion to support their representations. Widespread adverse recommendations from proxy advisory services did not occur despite warnings of heightened scrutiny of company decisions to exclude.

As SEC Chair Atkins noted following the 2026 season “. . .I am happy to report that the world did not end simply because the Commission staff stopped responding to no-action requests.”1 

He went on to comment that “[i]n a sense, the Division’s decision to not issue non-binding no-action letters was akin to removing the training wheels from the shareholder proposal bicycle. Over the years, companies and shareholder proponents have grown all too comfortable leaning on that support simply because it was there—not because they needed it.”2 

The SEC’s inaction, however, coupled with the additional tools for exclusion afforded by updated guidance in 2025,3 may have shifted proponent behavior in the unusual 2026 season in noticeable ways. Overall proposal submissions were down to 627, a decline of 19% from 2025, with 398 of those voted on, representing 63.5%, which was a higher percentage than the 60% that went to a vote in 2025. 

Governance proposals increased by approximately 21% over the prior year, while social proposals were down approximately 33%, with 141 submissions, down from 209 in 2025. Environmental proposals were down approximately 32%, with 75 submissions, down from 110 in 2025.4

While the decline in social and environmental proposals continues a trend observed over the last several years, the further reduction, coupled with the significant increase in governance proposals, may reflect a judgment by proponents that the risk of exclusion was too high for many social and environmental proposals, with a corresponding migration to proposals on core governance matters that can reliably avoid exclusion and are popular with shareholders.

At the same time, the absence of SEC involvement in the shareholder proposal process saddled companies with another complex variable in the proxy process, and one that is far less certain in terms of timing.

In the world of proxy preparation and annual meeting planning, timetables are precise and certainty is the most important deliverable. With the SEC no longer making determinations regarding shareholder proposal exclusions, companies were forced to contend with the possibility of potentially open-ended litigation in the middle of the annual meeting process should they take a position that, while principled, could be debated both ways.

Background: 2026 proxy season litigation

Litigation did in fact emerge as a significant factor in the 2026 season as a result of the new environment created by the SEC’s decision. The six actions brought against companies in connection with exclusion decisions during the 2026 season amounted to a significant upsurge, given the general absence of litigation during the last 50 years. Of these six cases, three were settled, two were essentially resolved in favor of the companies (one of which remains pending) and one was resolved in favor of the proponent.

While this type of litigation may become less relevant if the SEC succeeds in rescinding Rule 14a-8 entirely, a look at these actions may be instructive for the 2027 season which is unlikely to be affected by a final action on the rescission rulemaking. The SEC has already announced it intends to retain the 2026 process for the 2027 season, so once again companies and proponents will need to contend with a shareholder proposal season without the certainty that comes from SEC no-action review.

Two of the settled actions were settled quickly, almost immediately after filing, suggesting the companies may not have wanted the complications of litigation affecting their annual meeting processes.

In NYCERS v. AT&T Inc.,5 several New York pension funds challenged AT&T’s exclusion of an EEO-1 workforce diversity disclosure proposal on “ordinary business” grounds under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). AT&T had submitted a relatively short notice of exclusion which did not provide a detailed company-specific refutation of the proposal on ordinary business grounds. The case was settled shortly after filing, with AT&T agreeing to include the proposal.

In Masters v. PepsiCo Inc.,6 PETA challenged exclusion of an animal rights proposal on procedural grounds with a claim that the company failed to adequately inform the proponent of deficiencies. Given SEC historical practice and guidance on the need to inform and even educate proponents, this claim seems like it may have been difficult to defend, and the case was settled in a day, with the company agreeing to include the proposal.

Perhaps the most interesting of the settled cases was Nathan Cummings Foundation v. Axon Enterprises, Inc.,7 which challenged the exclusion of a proposal requesting the company to report on direct and indirect political spending. The company based its exclusion on “ordinary business” and “micromanagement” grounds under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) and provided a detailed company-specific analysis supporting the exclusion.

In its claim, the Nathan Cummings Foundation contested these bases for exclusion arguing that the SEC had long recognized that political spending transparency raises significant social policy issues and is an appropriate matter for shareholder consideration. The Nathan Cummings Foundation filed suit against Axon on February 17.

Subsequently, on March 6, the Nathan Cummings Foundation took the additional step of posting a detailed explanation of its rationale for bringing the litigation, as well as its broader views about the vacuum created by the SEC’s decision to change the no-action process.8 This explanation included the assertion that several companies were trying to establish a new “precedent” through the submission of notice of exclusion letters that challenged an entire category of proposals, which included exclusions of political spending disclosure proposals on micromanagement grounds.

The Nathan Cummings Foundation also stated its belief that the companies making these arguments are taking advantage of the SEC’s new approach to unilaterally omit the proposals based on flawed legal arguments.

Ultimately, the case was settled on March 9, several days after the Nathan Cummings Foundation’s post and two days before a scheduled hearing at which the court ordered testimony of a company witness regarding the difficulty, if any, of compiling political contribution information.

Axon agreed to publicly disclose its policies and governance framework for political spending, as well as certain contributions, over the next five years and the Nathan Cummings Foundation agreed to refrain from submitting further political spending proposals during the same period.

Cases brought against Chubb, UnitedHealth Group and BJ’s were either partially or fully resolved by the courts. In As You Sow v. Chubb Ltd.9 the proponent challenged the exclusion of a proposal requesting a report assessing whether pursuing subrogation claims against parties responsible for climate-related losses would benefit the company and its insureds.

The court denied As You Sow’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding that it did not demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on the merits, noting that subrogation is a core business function and that the proponent did not demonstrate that the proposal was focused on climate change, a transcendent social policy issue, rather than ordinary subrogation decision making.

The court also denied Chubb’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewal. Chubb filed its proxy statement without the proposal, after which As You Sow filed an amended complaint10 requesting an injunction against excluding an identical proposal which it intends to submit for the 2027 Annual meeting. That matter is pending.

In Fonds des Missions v. UnitedHealth Group,11 the proponent challenged the decision to exclude a proposal requesting a report on the healthcare consequences of the company’s acquisitions over the previous decade. The court denied the requested preliminary injunction finding that the scope of the proposal could pick up routine business matters and that the significant social policy exception did not apply because the social policy of healthcare regulation, while raised by the proposal, was not the real focus of the proposal.12

In DiNapoli v. BJ’s Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.,13 the proponent challenged the exclusion of a proposal requesting the company to conduct an assessment of deforestation risks from its private label brands and provide a report summarizing the results.

BJ’s argued that the proposal related to supply chain management which is an ordinary business decision of management. The court found that the proposal’s focus was actually on deforestation risk, a significant social policy concern, and granted the preliminary injunction.14 BJ’s also argued that the proposal was impermissibly vague.

Although the court criticized this argument because BJ’s had not included this basis in its notice for exclusion, the court considered—and rejected—the argument on the merits.

Accordingly, the court enjoined BJ’s from excluding the proposal from its 2026 proxy statement.

While the ostensibly conflicting outcomes in the Chubb, United Health and BJ’s cases can be rationalized under existing SEC guidance and no-action letter practice and may be in part driven by the record presented in each case, they underscore the complex and subjective nature of SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary business exemption under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).

These are in fact issues that the SEC itself has openly struggled with as it published iterative guidance with the intention of providing clarification and simplification and reducing subjectivity, including efforts to draw in and increase deference to corporate boards, all without much success.

What the litigation demonstrates is that the courts are no less challenged in applying these standards than the SEC was. Thus, the shift away from reliance on SEC decision making is not likely to provide greater certainty for companies and proponents as they wrestle with evaluating litigation risk and potential litigation outcomes for social and environmental proposals.

Filling the void

State legislative solutions

In the aftermath of the 2026 season, Chair Atkins reiterated his longstanding view that federal regulation of shareholder proposals inappropriately infringes on state corporate law governing corporations and their shareholders. He also implored states “that are competing to become—or remain—the leading destination for corporate domestication to ensure that their corporate laws do not enable the politicization of shareholder meetings.”15

No doubt state legislation in the shareholder proposal space may become increasingly active as the effort to roll back federal responsibility in this area takes shape.

Of course, the competitive issues Chair Atkins refers to in his remarks may complicate state legislative action as state lawmakers seek to strike the right balance between shareholder and corporate interests and defend or expand their respective franchises.

States seeking to be leading destinations for incorporation may chose to create “opt-in” statutes, which retain the ability of corporations to set their own standards through private ordering rather than adopting prescriptive one-size-fits-all legislation that could become a reason to avoid incorporation in their states.

Texas, one of the states that has made notable recent efforts to gain a greater share of corporate charters, had already started to take up the challenge before Chair Atkins’s plea by enacting a new section of the Texas Business Organizations Code providing an opt-in framework for shareholder proposals that went into effect on September 1, 2025.16 

The framework provides that to submit a proposal to the shareholders for approval at a meeting of shareholders, the proponent shareholder or group of shareholders must (a) hold voting shares equal to at least USD1 million in market value or 3% of the voting shares at the time of submission, (b) hold such shares for a continuous period of at least six months before the date of the meeting and through the duration of the meeting, and (c) solicit holders of at least 67% of the shareholders entitled to vote on the proposal. 

In order to opt in, the company must be listed on a national securities exchange, registered under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, and either have its principal office in Texas or be listed on a Texas-based exchange. It must also amend its governing documents to opt in and disclose the decision in its proxy statement.

The Texas shareholder proposal framework does not itself require companies that opt in to include shareholder proposals in the company’s own proxy statement; rather, it permits opting-in companies to impose additional eligibility requirements on proponents, while any inclusion obligation continues to remain under Rule 14a-8. There is no distinction between precatory and mandatory proposals in the framework.

The majority of U.S. public companies continue to be incorporated in Delaware despite some high-profile recent defections. While Delaware has the most longstanding and prolific body of corporate common law, there is remarkably little in the way of Delaware statutory or common law about proposals. 

The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) does not specifically address the subject of shareholder proposals. Instead, Section 211(b) of the DGCL requires holding an annual meeting for the election of directors and provides that any other proper business may be conducted at the meeting. The DGCL does not define what constitutes proper business. 

The only case law on the subject relates to binding proposals, and modern Rule 14a-8 proposal practice almost exclusively involves precatory proposals. Chair Atkins has repeatedly called into question the validity of precatory proposals under Delaware law, largely relying on a recent law review article by a Delaware practitioner,17 and the SEC left the door open for Rule 14a-8(i)(1) exclusion no-action letters by making an exception in its 2025 announcement (on the basis that the proposal is not a proper subject or action by shareholder under state law). 

As Chair Atkins acknowledged in July,18 however, not a single no-action letter was submitted on this basis. This may be because companies were reticent to cite this as a basis for exclusion without relevant court precedent for fear of becoming the relevant court precedent.

In an effort to try to close this gap in Delaware before a potential Rule 14a-8 recission ahead of the 2028 proxy season, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association published a white paper19 (Delaware White Paper) on November 9, 2026, including a discussion draft (Discussion Draft) of a potential legislative solution with respect to precatory shareholder proposals in Delaware.20 

The Discussion Draft’s proposed legislation would include a statute that would create a basket for a limited number of precatory proposals (between one and three proposals)21 that may be submitted at the annual meetings of larger corporations, measured by market capitalization and starting at USD30 billion in market capitalization for the lowest tier. Stockholders of companies with market capitalizations of less than USD30bn would not be able to submit precatory proposals.

The basket for each corporation would be filled with the proposals supported by the proponents and co-filers who own the most stock. A proponent would need to beneficially own at least USD250,000 in voting stock individually or USD1m together with up to nine co-filers. Companies could opt out with the approval of each class of voting stock, but that would mean shareholders may not submit precatory proposals at all.

Companies would also not be able to provide additional means to bring precatory proposals in their charters or bylaws or provide for greater or additional conditions or procedures. Any interested parties may post comments within 60 days of the publication of the white paper.

We expect there will be comments and that some institutional investors and governance advocates may find the thresholds high and the efforts to altogether rule out private ordering heavy-handed.

Texas has already acted. It could be that the Delaware legislature will jump into the fray as the elimination of Rule 14a-8 approaches and establish an approach on precatory shareholder proposals (consistent with the Discussion Draft if adopted after the comment period or otherwise) that responds to the Texas statute and addresses the uncertainty around precatory proposals in America’s most prominent incorporation jurisdiction.

Nevada too has taken a company-friendly stance in an effort to entice companies away from Delaware and may take specific steps to define and limit shareholder proposals to remain competitive.

In the meantime, in the absence of legislative action, the courts, particularly in Delaware, may have opportunities to define the extent of shareholder rights to propose matters for votes under existing law.

What seems certain, however, is that none of these will operate as true replacements for Rule 14a-8 because they are unlikely to impose an obligation on corporations to include shareholder proposals in company proxy statements, nor are they likely to recreate the subjective standards for exclusion that characterized the Rule 14a-8 system.

Instead, they are likely to operate as bright line tests that companies can adopt to provide some normative basis for the submission of proposals that could cover almost any topic provided the proponent meets the relevant standards and is willing to solicit shareholder votes at its own cost.

This may be a relatively favorable outcome for companies, but will it be satisfactory to shareholders, especially large institutional shareholders, and what might they want?

Private ordering

Another possible approach to addressing the rights of shareholder proponents in the absence of Rule 14a-8 is private ordering, a process whereby companies and shareholders agree to a set of proposal access standards that are then incorporated into company bylaws. The process by which proxy access bylaws (which provide for shareholder director nominations to be included in company proxy statements under certain circumstances) became widespread serves as an illuminating precedent.

In 2010, following changes to the DGCL specifically permitting bylaws to require inclusion of shareholder director nominees in company proxy materials, the SEC adopted a uniform proxy access right (Rule 14a-11).

That rule was vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court in 2011 and never took effect. In the ensuing proxy seasons a small number of shareholder proposals were submitted urging the adoption of proxy access bylaws. That trickle became a flood when the NY City Comptroller’s office included proxy access as part of its Boardroom Accountability Project and submitted 75 proxy access proposals in the 2015 proxy season, many of which received majority support.22 Within a few years proxy access bylaw terms had become relatively standard and a feature of most public company bylaws.

Despite strong institutional support and widespread adoption, proxy access bylaws have rarely been used. In that sense, they have a sort of “break glass in case of emergency” quality that provides reassurance to investors in the event of major failings at public companies they invest in.

For “shareholder proposal access,” the question will be whether institutional investors feel the same way about, and drive a similar push to adopt, bylaws to protect their ability to use some of what will be given up if and when Rule 14a-8 goes away. Specifically, will institutional investors join in demanding the ability to put a matter to other shareholders for a vote, most likely precatory, at a low cost using the company’s proxy statement and with reasonable conditions, in order to send a collective message to management and the board?23

Also, proxy access private ordering depended heavily on the availability of the Rule 14a-8 shareholder process itself, by means of which majority votes on precatory proposals were used as leverage to encourage companies to come to the table.

With the last Rule 14a-8 proxy season potentially coming up in 2027, investors may be short on time for this approach and may have to rely on other means of communication and persuasion. Companies may also want to consider whether having a reliable and agreed shareholder proposal access bylaw that is more restrictive than Rule 14a-8 may avoid other more aggressive strategies by activists that could be less predictable and costlier to deal with.24

Assuming efforts are made by companies and shareholders to achieve a private ordering solution, the following chart lists some of the key features of the most common version of proxy access bylaws and describes how they might fit into a proposal access bylaw:

Bylaw feature
Proxy access standard
Proposal access considerations
Mandatory or Precatory
Mandatory (director nomination)
 
Could be both but should at least contemplate precatory proposals given their predominance under Rule 14a-8. Texas statute does not distinguish.
Solicitation requirement
None—included in company proxy statement.
To replicate Rule 14a-8, should provide that a shareholder proposal is included in the company’s proxy statement like proxy access. Texas statute requires the proponent to make its own solicitation of at least 67% of the voting shares. If bylaws contemplate inclusion in company proxy statement a word limit analogous to the Rule 14a-8 500-word limit makes sense.
Exclusions
Technical for failure to meet qualification requirements.
Technical requirements for evidence of ownership threshold and duration, timing of notice and proponent information. Subjective bases for exclusion are best avoided. An independent arbitrator is likely impractical, and board self determination would impose significant obligations on directors and place them at the center of complex subjective judgments that could also subject them to fiduciary duty challenges.
Ownership threshold
3%
(usually, net long ownership)

Rule 14a-8 thresholds have been criticized as too low but 3% may be too high for a precatory proposal threshold given its lesser impact. Texas statute uses 3% or USD1m in market value. See also “Group size limit.”

Group size limit
Up to 20 shareholders can aggregate to meet ownership threshold.

Aggregation may be necessary, especially if high minimum ownership threshold is adopted. Expect traditional low ownership proponents to push for permissible aggregation so they can team up with collaborating institutional owners.

Ownership duration
Continuous ownership for at least three years.

While demonstrated continuous ownership should be a fundamental requirement, three years may be long for a precatory proposal. Texas statute requires six months. Rule 14a 8 currently requires one year for USD25,000 ownership, two years for USD15,000 ownership and three years for USD2,000 ownership.

Nominee cap
Greater of two directors or 20% of the board

Likely to impose a limit on number of shareholder proposals that can be submitted. Rule 14a-8 limits a proponent to one proposal per meeting. An aggregate limit could be considered, perhaps favoring proponents with larger ownership.

Renomination restrictions
Nominee who receives less than 25% support is ineligible for two years.
Rule 14a-8(i)(12) contains resubmission limitations depending on voting results and proposal frequency. Resubmission restrictions would appear to be important to avoid annual reconsideration of proposals generating little shareholder interest.
Submission deadline
120–150 days before the anniversary of prior year’s proxy mailing date.

Rule 14a-8 requires submission 120 days before the anniversary of the prior year’s proxy mailing date. Bracketing the timing of submission like Proxy Access may make sense.

What should companies be doing now?

The SEC’s likely permanent departure from the shareholder proposal no-action letter process and its proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety will continue to create uncertainty in the 2027 proxy season and, assuming the rescission proposal is adopted, a fluid environment for company/shareholder interactions over the ensuing years.

Management teams, boards and governance committees will want to consider the following as they navigate this changing landscape:

  • Expect a busier 2027 proxy season. With the 2027 season possibly being the last one before a rescission of Rule 14a-8 comes into effect, it is likely that advocacy groups and the perennial proposal proponents will see this as a final clear chance to submit a shareholder proposal. This may result in a very active season.
  • Be prepared for heightened litigation risk in 2027 proxy season. There is at least one more proxy season for which Rule 14a-8 will be fully applicable in its current form, but the SEC will not be responding to notices of exclusion. In light of the increased litigation in the 2026 season, companies planning to exclude submitted proposals should continue to accompany their notices of exclusion with detailed, company-specific analysis of the bases for exclusion. Moreover, companies should consider noting that the SEC has issued a release stating that the SEC has proposed to rescind the rule because it exceeds the SEC’s statutory authority. Companies should also take litigation risk into consideration as they consider their approaches to proposals they receive and understand how actual litigation could impact their annual meeting timetable.
  • Get ahead of potential shareholder proposal access bylaw proposals. Given this may be the last season under Rule 14a-8, there could be a concerted effort to submit proposals on shareholder proposal access bylaws. Companies should work with their boards to start forming a view on shareholder proposal access and use shareholder engagement to understand how institutional investors are thinking about it. These efforts will make responding to a potential proposal more effective and facilitate preparation of a statement in opposition, if appropriate.
  • Monitor state law developments. Companies should be monitoring the developments in their jurisdictions of incorporation that are focused on shareholder proposals or responsive to Rule 14a-8 rescission so that the impacts can be assessed and any avenues for input (such as the comment period for the Delaware White Paper) are considered.
  • Keep an eye on emerging strategies for activism. The imminent disappearance of Rule 14a-8 may drive new strategies and experimentation by advocates of corporate activism in social, environmental, anti-ESG and other areas that formerly used the Rule as a convenient outlet for expression. Companies should monitor these developments at other companies and consider what steps could reduce their own risk or whether adjustments to their activism playbooks are in order.
  • Keep up with the institutional investor response. Institutional investors and the organizations that represent them will likely issue public statements or position papers relating to Rule 14a-8 rescission that may be leading indicators of potential activism. Companies should monitor these developments, continue to use shareholder engagement to gain further insights and be thoughtful about how to engage in the event of approaches relating to private ordering solutions.
Footnotes 

1. Remarks by Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, at the Society for Corporate Governance Conference on July 9, 2026. 

2. Id.

3. See, Staff Legal Bulletin 14M. 

4. Shareholder proposal data is drawn from ESGAUGE for Russell 3000 companies with annual meetings that occurred between January 1 through June 30, 2026. The 2025 data is for a comparable period in 2025.

5. New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:26-cv-01201 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 17, 2026).

6. Masters v. PepsiCo, Inc., No. 7:26-cv-01432 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 19, 2026).

7. Complaint, Nathan Cummings Foundation, Inc. v. Axon Enterprise, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-00501 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2026).

8. See, Nathan Cummings Foundation v. Axon Enterprise, Inc.

9. As You Sow v. Chubb Ltd., No. 1:26-cv-00734, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69901 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026).

10. First Amended Complaint, As You Sow v. Chubb Ltd., No. 1:26-cv-00734 (D.D.C. May 8, 2026).

11. Complaint, Fonds des Missions v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., No. 1:26-cv-00970 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2026).

12. Fonds des Missions v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., No. 1:26-cv-00970 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2026) (order denying preliminary and permanent injunction).

13. Complaint, DiNapoli v. BJ’s Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-11075 (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2026).

14. DiNapoli v. BJ’s Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc., No. 26-cv-11075, 2026 WL 1762143 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 2026)

15. Paul S. Atkins Remarks, supra note 1.

16. See, Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.373

17. See, Kyle A. Pinder, The Non-Binding Bind: Reframing Precatory Stockholder Proposals under Delaware Law, 15 Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 1 (2026).

18. See, Paul S. Atkins Remarks, supra note 1.

19. See, White Paper on Stockholder Proposals. 

20. The White Paper notes that “Our goal is to have clear rules that can immediately replace Rule 14a-8, to stabilize the practice between corporations and stockholders, and to allow stockholders to continue engagement through non-binding proposals rather than resort to more drastic alternatives (like mounting “withhold” or “against vote” campaigns against incumbent directors, launching proxy contests to elect directors, soliciting proxies for binding stockholder proposals or engaging in social media campaigns).”

21. One, two and three proposals for companies with USD30bn–USD50bn, USD50bn–USD100bn and more than USD100bn in market capitalization, respectively.

22. See, Boardroom Accountability Project.

23. These efforts may be complicated by recent SEC guidance on the availability of Schedule 13G for institutional investors who participate in certain types of engagement with companies, particularly if they are seeking specific changes and tying those changes to voting decisions about company directors. See, Corporate Finance Interpretation 103.12 at SEC.gov | Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting. See also, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Climate Action 100+ and the Election of Directors at the May 2021 Annual Meeting of ExxonMobil Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 106611, (Oct. 7, 2026), available at SEC Report PDF.

24. State legislative actions that effectively rule out private ordering like the Delaware Discussion Draft proposal could also leave Companies without options to fine tune the proposal process. In that case they will have to hope their state legislature found a balance that reduces the likelihood of these more aggressive strategies.

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