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Beyond DExit: recent developments in state corporate law, business courts, and jurisdictional competition

Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey: Part 4

Beyond DExit: recent developments in state corporate law, business courts, and jurisdictional competition

Last year, this Survey provided a comprehensive overview of the legislative developments reshaping the jurisdictional landscape for U.S. corporations—from Delaware’s amendments to the DGCL through Senate Bill 21 providing clarity for controlled companies, among other things, to Texas’s creation of its Business Court and enactment of Senate Bill 29’s (SB 29) ownership thresholds for derivative lawsuits, to Nevada’s passage of Assembly Bill 239 establishing a company-friendly statutory business judgment rule.1

This year, the landscape has shifted from legislation to litigation: these reforms have now faced their first real courtroom tests, and we now have enough empirical data to separate signal from noise.

We examine two principal questions. First, are these reforms holding up? In 2026, there have been significant rulings out of Delaware and Texas that provide the first meaningful judicial validation (or limitation) of the 2025 legislative reforms. 

Second, how much of “DExit” is real versus perception? Drawing on the Delaware Division of Corporations’ 2025 Annual Report, proxy-season results through May 2026 and data updated through mid-2026, we unpack the statistics with respect to companies’ incorporation and reincorporation choices.

Delaware: courts and legislature continue to respond assertively

The past year has been a significant one for Delaware, as both its courts and legislature have acted to resolve outstanding questions and reinforce the predictability that has long made the state the leading jurisdiction for corporate governance.

In re Tesla: respecting companies’ governance choices

The Delaware Court of Chancery demonstrated its willingness to respect companies’ governance choices, even when those choices point litigation away from Delaware.2 

In In re Tesla, Vice Chancellor Bonnie W. David dismissed three consolidated derivative suits, enforcing Tesla’s Texas exclusive-forum bylaw retroactively, even though the suits predated both the bylaw’s adoption and the completion of Tesla’s redomestication from Delaware to Texas.

In re Tesla demonstrated that Delaware courts are prepared to enforce forum-selection bylaws that direct litigation to other states, including bylaws adopted in connection with a reincorporation. Companies that have moved or are considering moving to Texas or Nevada can take comfort that Delaware is unlikely to serve as a venue for collateral attacks on that decision.

Texas: a growing enforcement track record

If the story in Delaware is one of reassurance and stability, the story in Texas is one of momentum. Over the last year, Texas has moved from legislative ambition to judicial track record.

The Texas Business Court has issued its first wave of substantive corporate governance opinions, a federal court in Texas upheld SB 29’s derivative-suit share ownership requirement for the first time, the legislature has enacted additional governance-friendly legislation and several major companies have reincorporated in the state.

Gusinsky v. Reynolds: SB 29’s first major test

One of the most significant judicial developments for Texas corporate law this year was Gusinsky v. Reynolds, a federal district court decision that provided the first real test of SB 29’s derivative-suit ownership requirement.3

The plaintiff, a Southwest Airlines shareholder holding only 100 shares, filed a derivative action challenging the board’s decision to eliminate the airline’s “Bags Fly Free” policy. Southwest had adopted amended bylaws incorporating SB 29’s provision permitting corporations to set ownership requirements—up to 3% of outstanding shares—for shareholders to be entitled to bring derivative claims.

The court dismissed the suit with prejudice, holding that SB 29’s ownership threshold validly barred the claim.4 In doing so, the court rejected two significant constitutional challenges that the threshold was impermissibly retroactive as applied to the plaintiff’s pre-existing ownership, and that it violated the Texas Constitution’s “open courts” provision.

For companies that have adopted SB 29-style bylaws, or are considering doing so, the Gusinsky decision provides meaningful comfort. The ownership threshold, which is designed to prevent smaller shareholders from using derivative litigation as a tool to challenge ordinary business decisions, has now survived its first significant judicial test.

The Texas Business Court: an emerging body of precedent

Since beginning operations in September 2024, the Texas Business Court has issued a steadily growing number of written opinions including dismissing5 an owner’s individual conversion claim over corporate property for failure to sue derivatively or plead individual harm, declining6 to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident LLC shareholder and confirming7 that Texas, like Delaware, honors contractual limitations on LLC managers’ fiduciary duties, and that a corporate manager’s duties do not pass through to its individual officers and owners absent grounds for veil piercing.

New legislative developments

SB 2337: proxy advisory firms

SB 2337 requires proxy advisory firms making voting recommendations concerning shares of a Texas corporation, or a corporation headquartered in Texas, to either base such recommendations solely on the financial interests of shareholders or disclose any non-financial factors that subordinate shareholder financial interests.

The law is currently subject to ongoing litigation, and the Texas attorney general is enjoined from enforcing it against ISS and Glass Lewis at this time. If ultimately upheld, SB 2337 could meaningfully alter the proxy advisory landscape for Texas companies.

SB 1057: shareholder proposals

SB 1057 permits a Texas public corporation headquartered in Texas or listed on a Texas stock exchange to restrict shareholder proposal rights to shareholders who have continuously held, for at least six months prior to and throughout the meeting, shares valued at the lesser of USD1 million or at least 3% of the corporation’s voting shares.

By comparison, the federal shareholder proposal rule (Rule 14a-8) historically required holding only USD2,000 of stock held for three years, USD15,000 held for two years, or USD25,000 held for one year,8 and Delaware law imposes no comparable statutory ownership threshold. This provision is designed to ensure that shareholders seeking to place items on a company’s ballot have a meaningful economic stake in the enterprise.

2026 reincorporation activity

Several notable reincorporation moves in 2026 illustrate the accelerating pace of corporate migration to Texas. By mid-April 2026, Texas had already surpassed its full-year 2025 total of 26 reincorporation proposals.

ExxonMobil shareholders approved the company’s reincorporation to Texas in May 2026.9 This was one of the highest-profile corporate moves of the year, but it carries an important caveat: ExxonMobil was incorporated in New Jersey, not Delaware.10

ExxonMobil cited more than 35 years of Texas-based operations, including its headquarters, most of its senior executives, and approximately 30% of its global workforce in explaining the move, not dissatisfaction with New Jersey’s legal regime.11

Dell Technologies’ stockholders approved the company’s move from Delaware to Texas at its June 25, 2026 annual meeting with overwhelming support.12 Notably, principal stockholders Michael Dell and private equity firm Silver Lake held sufficient voting power to guarantee passage regardless of how proxy advisory firms or institutional investors voted.13

In July 2026, four large energy companies—Energy Transfer LP, Sunoco LP, SunocoCorp LLC and USA Compression Partners LP—announced redomestication from Delaware to Texas.14  

Notably, none of these four entities is organized as a corporation; they are limited partnerships and a limited liability company. Their conversions are governed by Delaware’s partnership and LLC statutes and their own governing agreements rather than the DGCL, and these alternative entities typically already have broad contractual freedom to limit or eliminate fiduciary duties, so the governance benefits of a move may differ from those available to corporations. The coordinated announcement moved approximately USD89 billion in aggregate equity value from Delaware to Texas.15

Not every Texas-bound proposal has succeeded. For example, Texas Capital Bancshares proposed a reincorporation from Delaware to Texas in 2026, but the proposal failed at the company‘s annual meeting in April 2026 after both ISS and Glass Lewis recommended against it.16

The company stated that it was “obviously disappointed” and attributed the result “in large part” to ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s “ill-informed influence.”17 Texas Capital has indicated that it intends to bring the proposal before shareholders again.

SpaceX illustrates how Texas’s legal reforms are enabling private ordering beyond what the statutes expressly contemplate. The company has adopted a 3% shareholding threshold for derivative suits, mirroring SB 29, and, more notably, has paired its Texas incorporation with a mandatory arbitration provision for securities class actions.18

This combination is arguably more viable under Texas law than it would be under Delaware law, given that Texas lacks an analogue to DGCL §115(c)’s requirement that forum selection provisions preserve access to a Delaware court.

Nevada: broad statutory protections, limited judicial testing

Nevada has continued to position itself as a primary alternative to Delaware for companies seeking a statute-focused corporate law regime. AB 239, enacted in 2025, defined controlling shareholders and their fiduciary duties, established safe harbors for conflicted transactions, adjusted Nevada’s statutory business judgment rule and authorized the creation of a specialized business court.

Nevada was the leading destination for DExit proposals in 2025, receiving 13 of 18 proposals from companies seeking to leave Delaware. High-profile moves to Nevada have included Roblox, Dropbox, Datadog, DoorDash and Samsara.

Despite this legislative activity and growing corporate interest, Nevada’s case law remains thin. AB 239’s business-judgment shield is arguably the most protective in the country, but the absence of a developed judicial record means that companies reincorporating in Nevada are operating with less precedential guidance than Delaware (or even Texas) provides.

Nevada’s proposed business court, which would handle complex commercial disputes, still requires a constitutional amendment and voter approval before it can become a standalone institution. 

Until the business court is operational and Nevada’s courts begin generating a meaningful body of corporate law decisions, the state’s competitive proposition will rest primarily on its statutory framework rather than judicial infrastructure.

The data: how much of DExit is real?

Proxy season data

Between January 2025 and May 2026, 33 proposals were filed by companies seeking to redomicile away from Delaware (24 to Nevada and nine to Texas).19In the first half of 2026 alone, 12 large public companies departed Delaware (seven to Texas and five to Nevada)20 The largest included Dell Technologies (USD258.1bn market capitalization), Datadog (USD45.7bn), and Samsara (USD18.4bn).21

Among the 12, several were controlled or founder-led companies where passage was assured or highly likely due to the founder’s stake: in fact, Samsara, Resolute Holdings Management and DoorDash completed their reincorporations by written stockholder consent rather than a shareholder vote at a meeting.22

At the other end of the spectrum, Archer Aviation’s reincorporation proposal from Delaware to Texas failed in June 2026 with an affirmative vote of only approximately 31%, underscoring the approval risk that non-controlled companies face.23 

Controlled companies may be particularly receptive to reincorporation away from Delaware because control, and the heightened scrutiny that accompanies controller or related party transactions, is alleged with unusual frequency in Delaware M&A litigation. In M&A litigation settlements in the Delaware Court of Chancery arising out of litigation initiated between 2012 and 2025, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant company was controlled in 96% of matters settled in 2025, up from 82% in 2020 to 2024.24

Although these figures measure only the frequency of control allegations, despite the Delaware corporate law reforms aimed at clarifying this area of corporate law, they suggest that controlled companies may have a stronger incentive to seek a jurisdiction with rules more protective of controlling shareholders.

The story for non-controlled companies is quite different. Of 14 DExit proposals at companies without a controlling stockholder, only six were approved. The remaining eight failed or were withdrawn, and in each case, ISS or Glass Lewis had recommended against the move. The Big Three institutional investors (Vanguard, BlackRock and State Street) typically voted against Nevada reincorporations in 2025, and none endorsed a move to Texas.25

IPOs and newly incorporated companies

An analysis found that new Delaware corporate formations increased approximately 30% in 2025 compared to 2024, greatly exceeding the prior trendline—suggesting that the DExit narrative has not translated into observable changes in incorporation behavior among newly formed entities.26

But if new formations tell one side of the story, departures tell the other. According to a recent tracking study (updated September 2026), the reincorporation trend has accelerated meaningfully. 

From January 1, 2024 through July 1, 2026, a total of 33 public companies, each with a market capitalization of at least USD250m (and reportedly with a total aggregate market capitalization of over USD3 trillion27), completed reincorporations from Delaware to another state, mostly Nevada or Texas. Over the same period, only five public companies reincorporated into Delaware, resulting in a net exit of 28 companies.28

The traffic is not entirely one-directional. In September 2026, Toppoint Holdings announced that its stockholders had approved a reincorporation from Nevada to Delaware.29

These departures, however, have not yet dislodged Delaware’s dominance in the IPO market. The percentage of companies considering an IPO that are incorporated in Delaware dipped from over 80% in 2022–2024 to approximately 70% in 2025, but rebounded to 87% in the first half of 2026.30

Weighted by IPO market capitalization, however, the percentage of companies considering an IPO that are incorporated in Delaware was just 7% in H1 2026, driven almost entirely by SpaceX’s (incorporated in Texas) approximately USD85bn IPO at a USD1.77tr valuation. Four of the five largest 2026 IPOs by market capitalization—Cerebras Systems, Madison Air Solutions, Arxis and Fervo Energy—were undertaken by companies incorporated in Delaware.31

In our view, the reincorporation data show genuine migration but not wholesale abandonment: Delaware remains the default jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Boards considering a change of domicile should carefully evaluate ownership concentration, litigation profile, shareholder-vote dynamics and the comparative depth of each jurisdiction’s judicial infrastructure before deciding whether a move advances the company’s interests.

Key takeaways

Delaware continues to respond to DExit concerns

The Delaware Court of Chancery enforced a Texas exclusive-forum bylaw retroactively in In re Tesla, demonstrating its willingness to uphold the provision despite the resulting removal of a high-profile dispute over the actions of the then-Delaware company to a Texas court.

Texas is building a real enforcement track record

A federal court upheld Texas’s ownership threshold of up to 3% of a company’s outstanding shares for derivative suits in Gusinsky v. Reynolds, and the Texas Business Court continues to develop a growing body of corporate law precedent. Additional legislation governing proxy advisory firm recommendations and shareholder proposal requirements further strengthens Texas’s appeal.

Nevada’s statutory protections are broad but largely untested

Nevada’s statutory business judgment shield is arguably the most protective in the country, but case law remains thin. Nevada’s business court still awaits a constitutional amendment and voter approval before becoming a standalone institution.

Reincorporation is highly fact-specific

Recent proxy season data reveal that controlled companies can push moves through regardless of proxy advisor opposition, but companies without concentrated ownership must carefully explain the rationale for the move and evaluate the likelihood of approval.

Not every high-profile move is a “DExit.”

ExxonMobil was never a Delaware corporation—it was incorporated in New Jersey. Delaware still hosts 68.2% of the Fortune 500, and its IPO market share, although dipping to approximately 70% in 2025, rebounded to 87% in the first half of 2026.

Footnotes

1. Mallory Tosch Hoggatt et al., Is “DExit” Real?: Recent Developments in Delaware, Texas, and Nevada Corporate Law and Business Courts, in A&O Shearman, 2025 Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey (Dec. 10, 2025). 

2. In re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2024-0631-BWD, 2026 WL 982336, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2026).

3. Gusinsky v. Reynolds, No. 3:25-CV-1816-K, 2026 WL 747179, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2026).

4. Id. at *6.

5. Stratton v. Hogan, 2026 Tex. Bus. 44 (4th Div. 2026).

6. CWK Mgmt. v. Maggi, 2026 Tex. Bus. 48 (1st Div. 2026).

7. Hinds v. Sandman Offshore, 2026 Tex. Bus. 63 (11th Div. 2026); Enosis Invs. v. Jensen, 2026 Tex. Bus. 19 (3d Div. 2026).

8. On September 16, 2026, the SEC proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8 entirely, which would leave the role of shareholder proposals to state law and company governing documents.

9. Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., ExxonMobil Announces Planned Effective Date for Move to Texas (June 22, 2026). 

10. Our History, ExxonMobil, https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/who-we-are/our-global-organization/our-history (last accessed Sept. 28, 2026).

11. Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 8, 2026).

12. Dell Technologies Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 25, 2026).

13. Dell Technologies Plans to Reincorporate from Delaware to Texas, Yahoo! Fin. (May 5, 2026).

14. Alexandra Samuels and Drew Hutchinson, Texas Fast-Tracks Business Filings as Delaware Exits Accelerate, Bloomberg L. (July 14, 2026).

15. See, Press Release, Energy Transfer LP et al., Energy Transfer LP, Sunoco LP, SunocoCorp LLC, and USA Compression Partners, LP Announce Redomiciliation to Texas (July 2, 2026).

16. Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 23, 2026).

17. Sasha Richie, Texas Capital Stays Incorporated in Delaware After Shareholders Reject ‘Dexit’ Vote, Dall. Morning News (Apr. 24, 2026). 

18. Mohsen Manesh, SpaceX Maps Texas Strategy to Dodge Securities Class Actions, Bloomberg L. (June 3, 2026).

19. Arthur B. Crozier et al., 2026 Proxy Season Trends: The Fracturing of Shareholder Power, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (June 11, 2026). 

20. Analysis Grp., DExit Trends: Tracking Reincorporations Away from Delaware (last updated Sept. 1, 2026).

21. Id.

22. See, e.g., DoorDash, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 18, 2026).

23. Analysis Grp., supra note 20.

24. Frank Schneider et al., Cornerstone Rsch., M&A Litigation Settlements in the Delaware Court of Chancery: 2012–2025 Review and Analysis, at 11 (Sept. 23, 2026). 

25. Crozier et al., supra note 19.

26. Andrew Verstein, An Update on DExit, from the Corporate Census, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Jan. 15, 2026). 

27. Analysis Grp., supra note 20.

28. Id.

29. Toppoint Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 11, 2026).

30. Analysis Grp., supra note 20.

31. Zi Ning, Viewpoint: Is Delaware Still the Default Home for America’s New Public Companies?, Del. Bus. Times (Aug. 17, 2026).

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