This is the BCA’s first decision on abuse of economic dependence, a prohibition that has existed since 2019 but that had, until now, been enforced almost exclusively through private litigation.
For businesses that buy from, or sell to, structurally weaker counterparties in Belgium, the decision converts a largely theoretical risk into a live enforcement exposure.
The legal framework
The prohibition on abuse of economic dependence was introduced into Belgian law in 2019. The Belgian legislator appears to have been inspired, in particular, by the French prohibition of abuse of economic dependence. Comparable rules exist in other jurisdictions such as Germany.
The provision prohibits undertakings from abusing their position over economically dependent undertakings if such behavior could affect competition in (a substantial part of) the Belgian market.
There are three conditions for the prohibition to apply.
Condition 1: a position of economic dependence
A position of economic dependence is defined as the dependence of an undertaking vis-à-vis one or more other undertakings, characterized by the absence of a reasonably equivalent alternative (available within a reasonable period of time, on reasonable terms, and at reasonable costs), allowing (each of) these undertakings to impose conditions or require performance of certain services that could not be obtained under normal market circumstances.
There is no need for a certain undertaking to be dominant in the market.
Various factors can be used to assess whether economic dependence exists:
- the relative market power of the other undertaking
- the share of the dependent undertaking’s turnover it represents
- control of technology or know-how
- brand reputation, product scarcity, or consumer loyalty
- access to resources or essential infrastructure
- fear of retaliation
- the regular grant of special conditions not granted to others
- and whether the dependent undertaking chose or was compelled to place itself in that position.
Condition 2: an abusive practice
The prohibition targets similar types of abusive practices as those caught by the Belgian abuse of dominance prohibition (e.g., imposing unfair trading conditions, limiting production and applying dissimilar conditions to similar obligations). However, the abuse of economic dependence provision goes further, also explicitly mentioning the refusal to supply or trade.
Condition 3: capable of affecting competition
The practice must be capable of affecting competition in the Belgian market or in a substantial part thereof. This condition was added by amendment to the original draft bill to prevent findings of abuse being reached too readily.
Breach may result in heavy sanctions
Infringements of the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence are subject to fines of up to 2% of the undertaking’s turnover generated on the Belgian market and from exports from Belgium.
While this maximum penalty is lower than for abuse of dominance infringements (where fines can reach up to 10% of global annual turnover), firms found to be in breach could still face significant sanctions.
The BCA’s first decision
The BCA’s full decision is not yet available but, according to the press release, the authority focused its investigation on a series of contractual provisions, in particular relating to the determination of the price of sugar beet and beet pulp and the related payment terms.
The BCA considered that these could qualify as an abuse of economic dependence in light of: (i) the dependence of the beet growers on RT; and (ii) the general uncertainty those provisions created, notably for the growers’ income prospects.
The authority found that the growers’ autonomy in managing their agricultural and commercial activities was unlawfully restricted and the commercial risks of the sugar value chain were disproportionately shifted onto them.
The commitments
Following a statement of objections issued by the BCA, RT offered commitments to address the authority’s concerns. These commitments were further tightened after a consultation with the representatives of the sugar beet growers.
In essence, RT has agreed to:
- amend certain contractual provisions, primarily with regard to setting the purchase price of sugar beet and the remuneration for beet pulp, and the exceptional adjustment of planned purchase volumes
- remove other contractual provisions, in particular those linking payment of part of the beet price to obligations relating to upcoming beet campaigns, and those transferring specific costs to the growers, and
- on that basis, negotiate the specific delivery conditions annually with the growers’ representatives, to arrive at a contractual balance characterized by dialogue, transparency and genuine regard for the growers’ interests.
The commitments enter into force as from the 2027 beet campaign and will run for at least five years. The BCA’s decision made these commitments binding and closed the investigation, without establishing an infringement.
Commitments rather than penalties
Three elements may have informed the parties’ strategy to offer commitments, and the BCA’s decision to accept them.
First, the problematic behavior was contractual in nature and therefore remediable by contractual redesign.
Second, the commitments are not merely static; the annual negotiation obligation builds an ongoing governance mechanism with the entire sector into the relationship.
Third, this was the BCA’s first case under a provision whose contours remain largely untested. Commitments gave the BCA a fast sector-wide outcome without the burden of proving an infringement or the risk of an appeal and allowed RT to resolve the case without admitting one. That is a familiar trade-off, but it leaves the scope of the abuse of economic dependence prohibition undefined.
What the decision signals
Beyond its immediate outcome, the decision provides some useful indications.
Abuse of economic dependence as a public enforcement tool
Until now, the prohibition had been enforced primarily through private litigation rather than by the BCA. The decision therefore marks the first BCA outcome in this area and could be an indication that additional investigations will follow.
Focus on the agricultural sector
Parliamentary materials published in preparation of the prohibition expressly refer to farmers and agricultural undertakings that supply larger companies without having many alternatives.
The BCA has chosen a first case that fits within that legislative intention, in a sector that has been a BCA priority for several years (as re-emphasized in the BCA’s 2026 priorities paper).
This aligns with a broader trend of antitrust authorities focusing on the agri-food supply chain, as documented in our 2025 antitrust enforcement report.
Sector-wide engagement
The objections concerned terms in individual grower contracts, yet the commitments were negotiated with representatives of the sector as a whole, most likely because of the fact that a significant number of beet growers supplied RT.
Key takeaways
1. Map your dependence relationships, not just your market shares
Screening for dominance will not necessarily catch exposure to economic dependence.
The question is counterparty-specific: does this supplier or customer have a reasonably equivalent alternative, available within a reasonable period of time, on reasonable terms and at reasonable costs? Focus on counterparties for whom you represent a large share of turnover, who have made relationship-specific investments, or who face significant switching barriers.
2. Scrutinize pricing and risk-allocation mechanisms
Review contractual clauses, including price-setting mechanisms, volume adjustment rights, cost pass-through provisions, and any clause conditioning payment on future-period commitments.
Provisions that shift commercial risk to dependent counterparties without corresponding consideration, or that leave the counterparty’s income structurally uncertain, appear to carry the highest risk, as these were the specific points of contention in this case.
3. Consider the commitment route early
Once an investigation has been opened, both the authority and the undertaking may have incentives to explore commitments.
Commitments have the advantage that no infringement is established through a formal decision. They also allow the investigated party to negotiate commitment conditions that are commercially workable. Finally, as this case suggests, commitments co-designed with affected counterparties have a greater chance of being accepted.
